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The global financial crisis placed bank transparency in the limelight of public interest 
(Financial Times, 2010).  A major source of bank transparency is banks’ financial reporting that 
helps to inform depositors, regulators, supervisors, and capital market participants about banks’ 
financial position, performance, business activities, and in particular risk-taking (Bushman and 
Williams, 2015; Freixas and Laux, 2012). 1   However, accounting information from financial 
statements is only a noisy representation of the underlying economic reality as the rules that govern 
the reported numbers often require the exercise of judgement (Bushman, 2016).   
The discretion inherent to accounting standards has two faces (Kanagaretnam, Lobo and 
Yang, 2004).  On the one hand, accounting discretion can increase transparency by allowing 
managers to convey private information to outsiders when having superior knowledge about a 
transaction that can otherwise not be reflected in the accounting system (e.g., Beaver, Eger, Ryan 
and Wolfson, 1989; Wahlen, 1994).  On the other hand, managerial discretion can also lead to the 
opportunistic application of accounting rules driven by reporting incentives that, in turn, undermine 
bank transparency (e.g., Vyas, 2011; Bischof, Laux, and Leuz, 2020).   
One major accounting choice in the banking industry that involves substantial managerial 
discretion is the accounting for loan losses (Liu and Ryan, 2006; Barth and Landsman, 2010; Beatty 
and Liao, 2014; Gebhard and Novotny-Farkas, 2011).  Loans are economically important for banks 
as they are the largest asset on most banks’ balance sheets and loan loss provisions represent the 
largest bank accrual for the majority of banks (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Acharya and Ryan, 2015).  
 
1  Bank transparency has many facets and ultimately arises from information collection, verification, and 
dissemination to stakeholders outside the bank who utilize this information in their decision making (Bushman, 
2014; Freixas and Laux, 2012).   
2 
During and after the global financial crisis (2007-2008) the accounting rules for loan loss 
provisions were frequently blamed for encouraging banks to recognize delayed and insufficient 
provisions as cushions against future loan losses (Dugan, 2009; Curry, 2013).2  This critique 
ultimately resulted in the introduction of redesigned and more forward-looking provisioning 
standards in Europe (IFRS 9) and the United States (ASU 2016-13).  
However, banks’ reporting choices can be influenced by a variety of incentives and 
pressures that go far beyond the design of accounting standards per se (Beatty and Liao, 2014; 
Bushman, 2014).  Bank-specific incentives such as capital market pressure, private ownership, 
taxation, or regulation are associated with discretion in recognizing loan losses (e.g., Beatty et al., 
1995, 2002; Collins et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Bushman and Williams, 2012).  Furthermore, 
individual manager incentives and preferences that are correlated with risk-taking, capital structure, 
and corporate reporting choices in general could play a significant role for banks’ provisioning 
behavior (Armstrong et al., 2010; Bamber et al., 2010; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Ge et al., 2011).   
Besides the discretion that arises from accounting standards or individual manager 
preferences, the institutional design and in particular enforcement can influence firms’ reporting 
behavior (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013; Holthausen, 2009).  In the banking sector, dedicated 
bank supervisors tend to dominate the public enforcement of reporting regulation (Bischof, Daske, 
Elfers, and Hail, 2020).  However, the supervisory and regulatory toolkit is not limited to direct 
enforcement by intervention into banks’ business activities through penalties and other corrective 
actions.  Bank supervisors can also take alternative actions to influence bank behavior such as 
 
2  The adverse consequences of delaying loan loss provisioning are manifold, feedback to the real economy and 
impair financial stability (Bushman and Williams, 2016; Ahmed, Takeda, and Thomas, 1999; Beatty and Liao, 
2011).   
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disclosures about banks’ risk exposure (e.g., through stress tests) in order to promote market 
discipline that eventually inhibits excessive risk-taking and fosters transparency (Goldstein and 
Sapra, 2014; Goldstein and Yang, 2019; Bischof and Daske, 2013).   
This thesis consists out of three chapters that all add to the literature on bank transparency.  
While the first chapter explores determinants of bank transparency at the most granular level by 
looking at individual managers and how they shape financial reporting decisions, the second and 
the third chapter document the role of bank, country, and supranational reporting incentives for 
banks’ reporting choices.  Within the next paragraphs, I describe the chapters of my thesis in more 
detail. 
In Chapter 1, I start with an investigation of individual managers and their inherent 
characteristics as potential determinants of banks’ financial reporting decisions.  The first chapter 
is based on a working paper that I wrote together with Jannis Bischof (University of Mannheim) 
entitled “Manager Characteristics and Banks’ Loan Loss Provisioning”.  While prior literature 
provides ample evidence on a variety of incentives and pressures that explain the variation in 
provisioning behavior across banks and over time, we know much less about variation in 
provisioning behavior within banks (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman, 2014).  Because the 
incentives and preferences of individual managers are associated with corporate reporting choices 
in general (Armstrong et al., 2010; Bamber et al., 2010; Ge et al., 2011), it is highly plausible that 
the characteristics of individual managers also play a role in a bank’s loan loss provisioning.  A 
better understanding of this role is particularly important because recent regulation in the banking 
sector is targeting the qualifications of individual managers (e.g., ECB, 2018a).  These regulations 
can only be effective if individual managers’ actions are meaningfully correlated with reporting 
choices that affect bank transparency such as the loan loss provisioning behavior.  
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We build on research in finance (Malmendier et al., 2011; Nguyen et al., 2017) and 
accounting (Ahmed et al., 2019; Livne et al., 2011; Bushman et al., 2018) that documents the 
influence of manager characteristics on corporate policies and examine whether idiosyncratic 
management styles help explain banks’ loan loss provisioning choices.  In contrast to prior 
literature that primarily focuses on specific traits and incentives, we identify the impact of 
unobservable traits that in combination translate into individual management styles.  We first 
disentangle and quantify this individual manager influence from firm-specific factors.  
Furthermore, we explore how individual management styles interact with top management team 
composition. 
To analyze the role of manager styles, we build on a dataset of top managers of US banks 
over the period from 1993 to 2015.  We combine information from different datasets that include 
observable characteristics (e.g., compensation, education, experience), firm characteristics (e.g., 
size, risk, performance), and accounting choices.  In a first step of our analysis, we test for the 
association between discretionary loan loss provisions and manager characteristics.  In our analysis, 
we distinguish between observable and unobservable characteristics.  We capture unobservable 
characteristics through a three-way fixed-effects structure that exploits the interconnectedness 
between managers that switch to another sample bank and managers that remain at the same bank 
(Abowd et al., 1999; hereafter AKM method).  These fixed effects capture all time-invariant 
manager characteristics and can be described as management styles for observable management 
choices even if the underlying factors explaining these choices remain unobservable.  Our results 
suggest that observable manager characteristics explain only a small amount of the variation in 
banks’ discretionary loan loss provisions, whereas idiosyncratic, yet unobservable attributes of 
individual managers account for approximately 19% of this variation (compared to 12% for 
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unobservable firm attributes).  This finding does not imply that individual bank managers have 
little influence on accounting choices, but rather that managers exert this influence through their 
preferences, skills, or talent that are notoriously hard to measure but key to a full understanding of 
managers’ role in the accounting process. 
In the second step, we explore whether managers loan loss provisioning styles relate to 
other relevant corporate actions.  We document a systematic correlation between the loan loss 
provisioning style and management styles for various corporate policies.  For example, managers 
with a greater level of discretion in the loan loss provisioning choice also reveal a preference for a 
higher level of risk-taking and, on average, a lower quality of the loan portfolio. That is, managers 
loan loss provisioning styles are systematically related to other corporate actions.  
In the third and final step, we build on the classification by Pitcher and Smith (2001) and 
distinguish between four different types of managers: technocrats, artists, craftsmen, and 
traditionalists.  Our classification rests on the manager styles that we identified through the AKM 
method in the previous step.  We use the different manager styles of members of a bank’s top 
management to get a measure for the diversity of top management teams that is derived from 
observable preferences for specific corporate actions. Based on these measures, we analyze 
whether the composition of top management teams potentially mutes the role that idiosyncratic 
manager styles play in the loan loss provisioning choice. We show that diversity of manager styles 
in the top management team mutes the significant association between the individual manager style 
and the level of reporting discretion. 
In Chapter 2, which is based on a working paper that I wrote together with Jannis Bischof 
(University of Mannheim) and Ferdinand Elfers (Erasmus School of Economics) entitled “Do 
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Supervisory Disclosures Lead to Greater Bank Transparency? The Role of Enforcement and 
Market Discipline”, we empirically investigate how bank supervisors can influence the 
transparency of supervised firms through enforcement and supervisory disclosures.  
In this project, we explore how a plausibly exogenous change in enforcement in conjunction 
with the supervisory disclosure of banks’ asset quality affects bank transparency. We exploit the 
shift from a purely national banking supervision to a unified European supervisor to identify 
differences in supervisory reporting preferences.  Since it is not straightforward to determine an 
objective and comparable measure of supervisory reporting preferences, we exploit the 
simultaneous Asset Quality Review (AQR) disclosures by the ECB.  This assessment included a 
point-in-time assessment of the accuracy of the carrying values of banks’ assets with a particular 
focus on the classification of non-performing exposures and loan loss provisions.  However, most 
of the AQR adjustments were not reflecting violations of accounting rules, but rather signaled a 
shift in supervisory reporting preferences within a common accounting framework, with the ECB 
generally preferring higher levels of provisioning than the national supervisors previously in charge 
of bank supervision.  We exploit this firm-level variation as well as the staggered shift to ECB 
supervision to analyze the change in affected banks’ reporting behavior and transparency in a 
difference-in-difference framework.  
We find that the ECB’s disclosed reporting preference is reflected in banks reporting 
behavior and market liquidity in the following periods.  We interpret this as evidence that banks’ 
reporting choices are influenced by supervisory preferences beyond simple compliance with given 
accounting standards.  The effect on banks reporting behavior is particularly pronounced for banks 
that experienced the greatest shift in supervisory characteristics. That is, banks whose prior national 
supervisory environment was characterized by low supervisory quality or had a higher likelihood 
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of political capture before the SSM.  We observe a corresponding effect on market liquidity that is 
more pronounced for banks that are likely to be subject to market discipline.  Furthermore, we 
identify the timeliness of loan loss provisions as potential channel through which the shift in 
reporting translates into reduced information asymmetry. Overall, our findings suggest that 
supervisory disclosures are potentially effective in establishing greater transparency of the banking 
sector, but depend on the presence of firm-level incentives that help to establish market discipline. 
In Chapter 3, which is based on a working paper with the title “Legal Efficiency and Non-
Performing Loans along the Economic Cycle”, I study how cross-country differences in legal 
efficiency interact with non-performing loans along the business cycle.  Many banks faced elevated 
levels of NPLs after the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. However, NPLs still 
represent a burden for banks balance sheets with European banks holding more than 580 billion 
euros of non-performing exposures at the end of March 2019 (ECB, 2019).  I start this study from 
the observation that in the aftermath of the severe economic downturn in the Eurozone caused by 
the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, only a subset of countries was able to 
substantially decrease their NPLs although most countries were facing favorable economic 
conditions .   
One explanation for this phenomenon could be the severe differences in contract 
enforcement and insolvency regimes across Europe that exacerbate uncertainty for banks and lead 
to slow loan write-offs.  Banks often have to wait for courts deciding on cases in order to determine 
the amount that has to be written off.  A typical foreclosure process (for a mortgage loan) in 
northern Europe can take up to three years, while it can be up to eight years in Greece (Fitch, 2016).  
However, despite the high importance of a swift process to resolve non-performing loans, there is 
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a lack of research on the impact of bank-specific or institutional determinants such as legal 
efficiency that potentially influence the duration of the NPL cycle.  
In the first step, I employ a proportional hazard model on the country-level to answer the 
question whether legal efficiency and economic growth influence the duration of NPL cycles.  I 
document that the increasing NPL phase is mainly associated with macroeconomic factors such as 
economic growth. However, the duration until a bank can decrease its NPL levels after the country 
enters an economic growth phase is substantially shorter for banks in countries with higher legal 
efficiency.  In the second step, I employ bank-level data to compare how macroeconomic, bank-
specific factors and institutional differences in legal efficiency are associated with NPLs over the 
economic cycle.  I employ various proxies for legal efficiency from prior literature (Djankov La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2003; Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2008).  My 
results consistently document that the duration and costs of contract enforcement and insolvency 
procedures are negatively associated with NPL ratios during economic growth phases.  Taken 
together my analyses documents that legal efficiency is significantly associated with NPL 
resolution whereas the increasing NPL phase is mainly determined by economic growth.  
This thesis provides answers to three important research questions related to financial 
reporting incentives and bank transparency. In Chapter 1, I document that a large proportion of the 
variation in banks loan loss provisioning behavior is explained by individual bank manager 
characteristics. Furthermore, the research presented in Chapter 2 documents that supervisory 
disclosures can foster market discipline that lead to higher overall bank transparency.  Finally, in 
Chapter 3, I provide evidence on the association between legal efficiency and non-performing loans 
along the business cycle that can help to inform the regulatory and supervisory debate on measures 
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to deal with elevated NPL levels that are likely to emerge after the recent virus-related economic 




Manager Characteristics and Banks’ Loan Loss Provisioning 
 
1.1.  Introduction 
What determines banks’ loan loss provisioning choices?  Prior literature provides ample 
evidence on a variety of incentives and pressures that explain the variation in provisioning behavior 
across banks and over time (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman, 2014).  However, we know much 
less about variation in provisioning behavior within banks (Bushman and Williams, 2015).  
Individual managers shape corporate actions such as risk-taking and capital structure choices 
(Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013).  Their incentives and preferences are 
associated with corporate reporting choices in general (Armstrong et al., 2010; Bamber et al., 2010; 
Ge et al., 2011).  However, little evidence exists on management’s role in the timing of loan loss 
recognition (Beatty and Liao, 2014).  A better understanding of this role is especially important 
because recent regulation in the banking sector is targeting the qualifications of individual 
managers (e.g., ECB, 2018a).  The potential impact of these regulations hinges on the influence 
that individual managers actually have on critical actions such as the loan loss provisioning choice. 
Against this background, we build on research in finance (Malmendier et al., 2011; Nguyen 
et al., 2017) and accounting (Ahmed et al., 2019; Livne et al., 2011; Bushman et al., 2018) that 
investigates the influence of manager characteristics on corporate policies and examine whether 
idiosyncratic management styles help explain banks’ loan loss provisioning choices. In contrast to 
prior literature that primarily focuses on specific traits and incentives, we identify the impact of 
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unobservable attributes that, in combination, translate into an individual management style.  We 
disentangle the overall influence of these idiosyncratic styles on the reporting outcome from firm-
specific factors.  In addition, we analyze how these management styles interact with top 
management team composition. 
To address these questions, we construct a comprehensive dataset of top executives of US 
banks over the period from 1993 to 2015.  The dataset combines information about manager 
characteristics (e.g., compensation, education, experience), firm characteristics (e.g., size, risk, 
performance), and accounting choices.  In a first step of our analysis, we test for the association 
between discretionary loan loss provisions and manager characteristics.  We distinguish between 
observable and unobservable characteristics.  We capture unobservable characteristics through a 
fixed-effects structure that exploits the interconnectedness between managers that switch to another 
sample bank and managers that remain at the same bank (Abowd et al., 1999; hereafter AKM 
method).  These fixed effects are supposed to capture latent time-invariant manager styles that 
describe preferences for observable management choices even if the underlying factors explaining 
these choices remain unobservable. 
In a second step, we analyze how the role of idiosyncratic manager styles in the choice of 
loan-loss provisions relates to other relevant corporate actions.  To this end, we compare the time-
invariant manager style that manifests in the choice of loan loss provisions with other management 
choices that affect a bank’s risk-taking (such as leverage or loan quality).  To better understand 
commonalities in the role that individual managers play in these different decisions, we test 
whether these fixed effects (i.e., the different manager styles) are associated with observable 
demographics, occupational status, or education of individual managers and with their risk-taking 
incentives.  Put differently, we test whether the unobservable style that the fixed-effects capture 
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under the AKM method is systematically correlated with observable factors.  We follow 
Baik et al. (2011) and also employ principal components analysis to combine these different factors 
and construct a manager-specific score to overcome the noise inherent to the measurement of 
individual characteristics and incentives. 
In a third and final step, we build on the classification by Pitcher and Smith (2001) and 
distinguish between four different types of managers: technocrats, artists, craftsmen, and 
traditionalists.  Our classification rests on the manager styles that we identified through the AKM 
method.  We use the different manager styles of members of a bank’s top management to get a 
measure for the diversity of top management teams that is derived from observable preferences for 
specific corporate actions.  Based on these measures, we analyze whether the composition of top 
management teams potentially mutes the role that idiosyncratic manager styles play in the loan loss 
provisioning choice. 
Our results suggest that observable manager characteristics and incentives explain only a 
relatively small amount of the variation in banks’ discretionary loan loss provisions.  We rather 
find that idiosyncratic, yet unobservable attributes of individual managers account for 
approximately 19% of this variation (compared to 12% for unobservable firm attributes).  The low 
correlations between observable characteristics and reporting outcomes thus do not imply that 
individual bank managers have little influence on accounting choices.  Managers exert this 
influence in an idiosyncratic way through their preferences, skills, or talent that are notoriously 
hard to measure but key to a full understanding of managers’ role in the accounting process. 
We find that some observable characteristics are correlated with the unobservable factors 
that reflect preferences for observable outcomes at the firm level.  However, these correlations are 
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little systematic and they vary substantially across different corporate policies that managers 
potentially influence.  Most of the cross-sectional variation in manager styles remains, therefore, 
unexplained.  The manager styles are still economically meaningful because the direction of the 
underlying preferences for certain corporate policies appears systematic.  For example, managers 
with a greater level of discretion in the loan loss provisioning choice also reveal a preference for a 
higher level of risk-taking and, on average, a lower quality of the loan portfolio.  That is, managers 
who have a distinct impact on the loan loss provisioning do exert their influence on other corporate 
actions in a systematically related way.  We exploit these relations to construct four different 
categories of managers that we label according to Pitcher and Smith (2001).  Managers whom we 
label as ‘technocrats’ and ‘artists’ employ systematically more discretion in the provisioning choice 
than ‘craftsmen’ and ‘traditionalists’.  These associations are statistically significant and 
economically meaningful. 
However, we also find evidence consistent with these top managers interacting with other 
members of the executive board.  Diversity of manager styles in the top management team mutes 
the significant association between the individual manager style and the level of reporting 
discretion.  Overall, these findings suggest that the focus of bank supervisors on the skills and 
qualifications of individual managers can be justified by the systematic impact that these 
characteristics have on relevant corporate policies, at least in combination with other members of 
the top management team.  Yet, the evidence also implies that the focus should build on top 
managers’ revealed preferences as reflected in key policies rather than on readily observable 
attributes. 
Our study contributes to two different streams of the accounting literature.  First, we add to 
the understanding of the determinants of banks’ loan loss provisions.  Going back to at least Beaver 
14 
et al. (1989), the literature on the discretion and timing in recognizing loan losses has examined 
various bank-specific incentives such as capital market pressure, private ownership, taxation, or 
regulation (e.g., Beatty et al., 1995, 2002; Collins et al., 1995; Ahmed et al., 1999; Bushman and 
Williams, 2012) as well as variation over time (e.g., Liu and Ryan, 2006; Beck and Narayanmoorth, 
2013).  However, we know relatively little about the impact of individual bank managers on the 
provisioning choice.  One recent exception is Ahmed et al. (2019) who document the association 
between managers’ previous crisis experience and the timeliness of loan loss provisions during the 
financial crisis.  We extend this result beyond a single attribute and show the influence of both 
observable and unobservable manager characteristics in crisis and non-crisis periods.  This finding 
helps understand the impact of recent regulation that targets the qualifications and behavior of 
individual bank managers. 
Second, we add to the growing literature on the impact of manager characteristics on 
reporting outcomes in general.  This literature documents that manager styles help explain 
voluntary disclosure (Bamber et al., 2010), accounting choices (Ge et al., 2011; Dejong and Ling, 
2013), disclosure tone (Davis et al., 2015), or tax avoidance (Dyreng et al., 2010).  The role of 
individual managers in the reporting process is associated with individual attributes such as military 
experience (Law and Mills, 2017), masculinity (Jia et al., 2014), narcissism (Ham et al., 2018; 
Young et al., 2016), religiosity (Dyreng et al., 2012), materialism (Bushman et al., 2018), gambling 
attitudes (Christensen et al., 2018), tenure (Ali and Zhang, 2015), gender (Francis et al., 2015), age 
(Huang, Rose-Green & Lee,  2012), ability (Demerjian et al., 2013), and overconfidence (Hribar 
and Yang, 2016; Schrand and Zechman, 2012).  The identification of individual attributes in these 
prior studies typically relies on samples of managers who moved between firms and, therefore, 
tend to have unique characteristics.  We borrow from the literature in finance and economics (e.g., 
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Graham, Li and Qiu, 2012; Lopes de Melo, 2018) and use the AKM method to expand the sample.  
By exploiting the interconnectedness between moving and non-moving managers, we show that 
the inclusion of non-moving managers into the sample substantially increases the explanatory 
power of the manager characteristics.  Related to this, we pick up recent insights on the importance 
of board composition (e.g., Li and Wahid, 2018; van Peteghem, Bruynseels & Gaeremynck, 2018) 
and present results consistent with the diversity of manager styles in a bank’s top management 
muting the dominant influence of individual managers. 
 
1.2.  Prior research and empirical predictions 
1.2.1. Empirical approaches to identify manager characteristics 
Classic economic theory offers ambiguous predictions on whether the individual 
characteristics of managers have any influence on corporate decisions.  Neoclassical theory views 
managers as homogeneous input into firms’ production process and variation in executive 
characteristics do not play any role (Veblen, 1900; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).  Relatedly, the new 
institutional theory suggests that organizational boundaries, conventions, and norms constrain the 
impact of any individual on firm-level outcomes (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   
In contrast to these predictions, Hambrick and Mason (1984)’s upper echelon theory builds 
on managers’ personality, experience, and values being the main driver of organizational decisions 
within a firm.  Put differently, the upper echelons theory suggests that two seemingly identical 
managers with a similar education, age, tenure, and compensation can vary in how they affect 
corporate actions because of their latent unobservable personality and ability.  While the recent 
economic theory from Dessein and Santos (forthcoming) is consistent with these individual 
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manager effects, it attributes the idiosyncratic manager styles to attention allocation rather than to 
cognitive biases of managers.  Therefore, idiosyncratic manager effects could appear even when 
manager’s information processing is optimal and not driven by behavioral biases. 
Prior empirical literature offers evidence consistent with the upper echelons theory and the 
attention theory by Dessein and Santos (forthcoming).  These studies differ in the empirical 
identification of the role of individual managers.  A first set of studies focuses on a single 
managerial trait and investigates, for example, the association between firm policies and manager-
specific variables such as gender (Francis et al., 2015), age (Huang et al., 2012), tenure (Ali and 
Zhang, 2015), masculinity (Jia et al., 2014), ability (Demerjian et al., 2013), cultural heritage 
(Brochet et al., 2019), and prior legal infractions (Davidson et al., 2015).  While these studies 
provide relatively robust evidence on the existence of these associations, individual managerial 
traits likely manifest themselves not in isolation, but rather in certain combinations of specific 
attributes (e.g., Adams et al., 2018).  The empirical design of these studies does, by construction, 
not disentangle the impact of the specific trait from other time-invariant firm attributes. 
A second stream of literature exploits managerial mobility between firms to overcome the 
inherent identification challenges.  The use of mover-dummy variables isolates the manager styles 
innate to managers that move between different firms.  These manager styles capture bundles of 
latent individual traits rather than specific characteristics.  Evidence suggests that they are, inter 
alia, associated with firms’ forecasting behavior (Bamber et al., 2010), conference call tone (Davis 
et al., 2015), corporate tax avoidance (Dyreng et al., 2010), and earnings management (Ge et al., 
2011).  However, the sample selection in the first place is confined to managers who move between 
firms.  If moving managers differ systematically from managers without any observable mobility, 
the sample restriction leads to biased estimates because of endogenous matching between managers 
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and firms (Fee et al., 2013; Pan, 2017).  For example, firms plausibly decide to replace managers 
concurrently with the decision about certain policy changes, and therefore, any changes in 
management style can overlap with the economic circumstances that caused the managerial 
turnover in the first place. 
The third and most recent approach is the employment of the AKM sampling technique.  
The method accounts for the potential difference between moving and non-moving managers and, 
therefore, does not solely rely on moving managers.  Instead, the AKM method exploits the 
connectedness between different groups of managers.  Evidence that is derived from the application 
of the AKM method suggests that individual manager styles affect compensation 
(Graham et al., 2012), corporate social responsibility (Davidson et al., 2019), earnings 
management (Wells, 2020), audit fees (Lauck et al., 2020), and tax avoidance (Law and Mills, 
2017).  We extend this stream of literature and employ the AKM method to explore the role of 
individual bank managers in banks’ loan loss provisioning choices.  To alleviate remaining 
matching concerns, we additionally exploit a sub-sample of plausibly exogenous manager 
turnovers. 
1.2.2.  The role of individual managers in banks’ loan loss provisioning choices 
Banking is a highly regulated industry with regulation imposing relatively strong 
constraints on the individual manager (e.g., Beatty and Liao, 2014; Hollander and Verriest, 2016).  
For example, recent regulation (e.g., on management compensation) is increasingly limiting the 
influence of individual manager’s incentives on bank-level decisions.  At the same time, banking 
supervisors become more involved in the screening of individual manager characteristics during 
the recruiting process (e.g., Busch and Teubner, 2019).  Against this background, the level of 
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management discretion in banks is relatively more confined than in other industries.  For these low-
discretionary industries, the upper echelons theory and the attention theory predicts a lower 
influence of idiosyncratic manager preferences on corporate decisions (Hambrick, 2007; Crossland 
and Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick and Quigley, 2014; Dessein and Santos, forthcoming).  Instead, 
firm-level discretion mainly arises from environmental conditions and governance structures in 
these types of industries. 
On the other hand, in any regulated industry, it is unlikely that shareholders, boards, and 
supervisors will be able to write perfect contracts that entirely limit discretion.  This is particularly 
critical for a task that is as inherently subjective and complex as the provisioning for future loan 
losses.  Banks have to recognize loan loss provisions if it is probable that a loan is impaired and if 
the amount can be reasonably estimated.  When bank managers assess these criteria, they frequently 
distinguish between general loan loss provisions for portfolios of homogenous loans (e.g., different 
classes of consumer loans) and specific provisions for large individual loans.  They use complex 
statistical models for the estimation of general loan loss provisions with the input into these models 
being subject to substantial managerial judgment.  The judgment is even greater when managers 
determine individual loan loss provisions for large commercial loans and, through these decisions, 
bank managers directly intervene into the corporate reporting choice.  For these complex and 
subjective tasks, the upper echelons theory predicts an even increasing impact of individual 
characteristics and past experiences on corporate decision-making. 
Overall then, the nature of regulation in the banking industry as well as the nature of the 
loan loss provisioning task result in opposite predictions leaving the role of individual managers in 
the shaping of banks’ loan loss provisioning behavior as, ultimately, an empirical question. 
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1.2.3.  The role of top management team composition  
While recent empirical evidence tends to support the notion of individual managers being 
key to the explanation of corporate decisions, the literature also suggests that top management team 
diversity mitigates this impact (Adams and Ferreira, 2010; Garlappi, Giammarino and Lazrak, 
2017).  That is, group dynamics can influence organizational outcomes even without the presence 
of observable agency conflicts or information asymmetries.  Prior evidence from non-banks 
exploits differences along observable characteristics such as age, tenure or education and is 
generally consistent with diversity also interacting with the managerial influence on corporate 
reporting choices (e.g., Li and Wahid, 2018, Van Peteghem et al., 2018). 
It is less clear whether these dynamics also evolve in banks’ loan loss provisioning 
decisions.  The decisions about general and individual loan loss provisions depend on highly 
specific knowledge of individual managers.  Educational and functional diversity is particularly 
pronounced for board members in the banking industry and potentially leads to substantial 
knowledge gaps (e.g., Berger et al., 2014; Macey and O’Hara, 2016).  The difference in task 
knowledge eventually translates into the reliance on one individual manager.  This is consistent 
with Graham et al. (2013)’s observations which suggest that oversight should “[...] use outsourced 
expertise in technical subjects such as valuing assets like mortgage-backed securities, residual 
assets or compliance with loan loss reserves” (p. 29). 
There is very limited evidence on top management team diversity within banks.  Extant 
literature documents that educational and functional heterogeneity can prove beneficial for bank 
innovations (Bantel and Jackson, 1989) and, especially, during mergers (Hagendorff, 
Collins & Keasy, 2010).  We build on this literature and investigate whether the diversity of top 
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management teams in banks moderates the influence of individual managers’ discretion on loan 
loss provisions. 
 
1.3.  Data 
We collect banks’ financial accounting data from Compustat banks, stock market data from 
(CRSP) and manager data from ExecuComp3 and BoardEx.  Our sample period spans from 1993 
to 2014 because of data requirements about future and prior non-performing loans.  We 
identify 207 banks, 1,858 managers (9,893 observations) with available CRSP, Compustat, 
BoardEx, and ExecuComp data.  We limit the dataset to 108 banks that employed at least one 
manager who switched to another bank during the sample period allowing us to separate firm and 
manager effect with the AKM sampling technique.  That is, our final dataset with available 
information on manager characteristics from BoardEx and Execucomp includes 4,740 observations 
and 911 distinct managers that worked for 108 banks.4  We focus on the five highest-paid managers 
within each bank, including positions such as CEO, CFO, CRO (Chief Risk Officer), CIO (Chief 
Information Officer), and General Counsel.  While evidence from other industries suggests that 
CEOs and CFOs differ in their influence over reporting decisions (Jiang et al., 2010), it is ex ante 
unclear whether the idiosyncratic influence of bank managers on loan loss provisions is associated 
with a specific job title within the top management team. 
 
3  ExecuComp covers all banks that were included in the S&P 1500 at least for one year. ExecuComp is available for 
periods from 1992 onwards.  
4  That is, we capture roughly 50% of the full Execucomp-Boardex-Compustat sample, whereas the mover dummy 
variable method (e.g. Betrand and Schoar, 2003; Bamber et al., 2010) would restrict the sample to 98 managers 
that moved across banks (less than 11% of all managers in the full sample). 
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1.4.  Measuring loan loss provisioning quality 
For our investigation of manager’s loan loss provisioning choice, we follow Beatty and 
Liao (2014) and measure banks loan loss provisioning quality by estimating a model that separates 
the loan loss provision in a systemic and a discretionary part using quarterly bank data from 
Compustat banks. If managers idiosyncratically influence the loan loss provision this should be 
reflected in the variation of the loan loss provision that is not explained by macroeconomic and 
firm fundamentals, such as changes in GDP or non-performing loans.  Therefore, we use the 
residuals from the following pooled OLS regression that capture only variation unaccounted for by 
bank or macroeconomic fundamentals: 5   
(1) 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼0+𝛽1∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡+1 + 𝛽2∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡+𝛽3∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡−2+𝛽5∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑗,𝑡
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐻𝑃𝐼𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗,𝑡 
Where  𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑗,𝑡  denotes loan loss provisions scaled by lagged total loans, ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡  is the 
change in non-performing loans from period 𝑡 to period 𝑡 − 1 scaled by total loans in 𝑡 − 1.  We 
also include lagged (∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡−1) and forward looking (∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑗,𝑡+1) changes in non-performing loans 
because banks potentially use this information to approximate changes in loan portfolio risk in 
order determine the loan loss provision (Beatty and Liao, 2014).  Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets and captures bank resources, sophistication, and business model differences that could 
affect provisioning policies (Bhat et al., 2019.  ∆𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 denotes changes in total loans and captures 
banks prior loan loss accruals (Nicoletti, 2018).  We include the natural logarithm of Tier 1 
regulatory capital (𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙) to control for banks’ incentive to manage regulatory 
 
5  Beatty and Liao (2014) find that this model most accurately predicts earnings restatements and comment letters. 
However, our results are robust to using the three other models from Beatty and Liao (2014), the model of Bushman 
and Williams (2012) or Liu and Ryan (2006). 
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capital through provisioning behavior (Liu and Ryan, 2006).  We use gross domestic product 
(𝐺𝐷𝑃) data from the Federal Reserve bank of St. Louis and house price index data (𝐻𝑃𝐼) from the 
Federal Housing Finance Agency to capture changes in the macroeconomic environment.  In 
addition, we include quarter fixed effects to account for macroeconomic changes affecting all banks 
in a given quarter.  Standard errors are clustered by bank to control for time-series correlation 
within banks (Petersen, 2009). 
We construct two proxies for discretionary loan loss provisions from equation (1). First, we 
calculate the natural logarithm of the absolute yearly mean residuals to capture the overall 
discretionary loan loss provisioning behavior.  Second, we employ the yearly mean of the signed 
residuals as proxy for signed discretionary loan loss provisions.  Positive residuals signal that 
managers provision more than predicted by the model, whereas negative residuals indicate 
underprovisioning.  While both overprovisioning and underprovisioning could undermine bank 
transparency, positive residuals may signal proprietary management information about credit 
losses (Jiang et al., 2016).  In contrast, negative residuals should rather point at discretionary 
understating of the loss provisions.   
 
1.5.  The role of individual managers in the LLP choice 
1.5.1.  Research design 
Banks and their executives are highly interrelated through contracts and incentives. 
Therefore, a major methodological challenge is to separate the manager fixed effect from the 
impact of the firm on loan loss provisions.  If a manager works at the same bank over the whole 
sample period, both effects would be perfectly collinear and therefore, indistinguishable.  Prior 
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studies solve this issue building on samples that require each manager to switch firms at least once 
during the sample period (mover method, e.g., Dyreng et al., 2010, Yang, 2012, Davis et al., 2015).  
This has primarily two disadvantages.  First, the sample is limited to switching managers.  Because 
managerial turnover is observed relatively infrequent this reduces the sample size significantly.  
Second, switching managers differ systematically in their characteristics from managers who stay 
at the same firm.  This leads to sample selection bias, if differences in the likelihood of managerial 
mobility are correlated to managers’ loan loss provisioning behavior.6  
The AKM method circumvents both issues by solving the identification problem through 
the interconnectedness of managers and firms within groups.  More specifically, while the mover 
method can identify a manager effect only if the person worked for at least two banks, the necessary 
and sufficient identifying condition within the AKM method is that a manager worked for a bank 
that employed at least one manager who switches the employer during the sample period 
(Abowd et al., 2002).  Put differently, we can exploit information from all banks that employed at 
least one manager who switches the employer during the sample period.  Additionally, all other 
managers who worked for these banks are included in our sample.  Therefore, our sample includes 
also a large proportion of non-moving mangers, reducing potential selection bias while increasing 
sample size.  
Studying the manager fixed effects has several advantages.  First, it is not necessary to 
specify a relation between time-varying executive characteristics and firm characteristics.  Second, 
by controlling for firm fixed effects, we can at least partially address reverse causality concerns 
due to firms selecting new executives for a specific provisioning style (Fee et al., 2013).  Precisely, 
 
6  In Table 2 we confirm that mover managers differ significantly across several observable characteristics from non-
moving managers. 
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we can rule out selection bias resulting from matching based on time-invariant or the included 
time-varying manager and firm characteristics.  We further address these concerns by using 
plausibly exogenous turnovers in a robustness test.  Using the AKM method we estimate the 
following three-way fixed effects model to specify the manager and firm effect on discretionary 
loan loss provisions: 
(2) 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑖,j,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛽 + 𝑊𝑗,𝑡 𝛾 + 𝜙𝑗 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖,j,𝑡 
Where 𝑖 denotes executives, j denotes firm and 𝑡 denotes the year of the discretionary loss 
provision (DLLP). 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  represents time-varying manager characteristics including compensation 
incentives (delta and vega), age and tenure of the manager.  We measure risk-taking incentives 
(vega) with the dollar change in wealth linked to a 1% increase in stock return volatility.7  The pay-
performance sensitivity (delta) is measured with the dollar change in a manager’s wealth to changes 
in a bank’s stock price performance.  Both measures are scaled with total cash compensation and 
log-transformed (Edmans et al., 2009).8   𝑊𝑗,𝑡  represents time-varying firm characteristics and 
includes the market-to-book ratio and size to capture potential business model differences of banks 
that may vary over time. Furthermore, we include firm fixed effects (𝜙𝑗), manager fixed effects 
(𝜃𝑖) and year fixed effects (𝜇𝑡).  The main variable of interest in our analysis is the manager fixed 
effect 𝜇𝑡 that captures all time-invariant manager characteristics such as managers gender, ability 
and personality. 
 
7  Risk-taking incentives from stock option compensation result from the asymmetric payoff function of stock options 
(Core and Guay, 2002). Option holders can benefit if the stock price rises above the strike price, however, vice 
versa option holders do not have to pay the difference in case the stock price declines. Nevertheless, option 
compensation can also affect individual risk-taking negatively due to the sensitivity of an executive’s wealth to 
changes in stock price (delta). That is, a risk averse manager might be reluctant to take risks if his wealth is mainly 
invested in stock options and he has no ability to hedge this risk. 
8  We thank Lalitha Naveen for providing the data on compensation incentives from Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006). 
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To estimate equation (2) we follow the approach proposed by Abowd et al. (2002) and start 
by forming groups of connected managers and firms.9 Within these groups of connected managers 
we can identify manager and firm effects. In the first step, we construct the mean discretionary 
provision of all executives to obtain the executives’ average discretionary loan loss provision 𝑌?̅?.  
In the second step, we subtract this average from equation (1) to wipe out the executive fixed effect.  
By using the information of the moving managers it is now possible to identify the firm fixed 
effects using ordinary least squares.  Finally, the manager fixed effect can be recovered with the 
information about the firm fixed effect.10  The resulting fixed effects are unbiased, whereas the 
time-varying estimates are unbiased and consistent (e.g., Wooldridge, 2010).  Furthermore, 
because fixed effects are computed relative to a within-group benchmark, we normalize the fixed 
effects to make them comparable across groups following the procedure from Graham et al. (2012). 
To obtain accurate estimates for the manager and firm fixed effects, a certain degree of 
mobility is necessary to avoid an estimation bias (Andrews, 2008; Gormley and Matsa, 2014).  
Mobility appears to be relatively high in our sample when compared to other studies.  Table 1.1 
documents that 10.76% (98 out of 911) of the managers change employers at least once, compared 
to 4.91% movers in Graham et al., (2012) or 4.56% in Hagendorff et al., (2019). 
 
9  This works as follows: We start with an arbitrarily chosen manager and include all banks this manager worked for. 
In the second step, all managers who worked for these banks are included. This procedure is repeated until no more 
managers or banks can be added to the group. We start over with the next group until all data is exploited. This 
algorithm results in groups of connected executives and banks. Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) formally prove 
that connectedness is necessary and sufficient for identification of worker and firm fixed effects.  
10  More detailed information on the exact calculation can be found in Graham et al. (2012) or Liu, Mao and Tan (2016)  
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Table 1.1  Manager mobility and connectedness 
Panel A: Number of movers out of all managers   
Mover  # Of firms in which managers have been employed #Managers % Cum. 
          
No 1 813 89.24 89.24 
Yes 
2 96 10.54 99.78 
3 2 0.22 100 
          
  Total 911 100.00 - 
Panel B: Groups of connected banks 
Group Manager-years #Managers #Movers #Banks 
1 33 13 1 2 
2 1,451 299 41 33 
3 603 93 14 13 
4 137 18 1 2 
5 133 26 2 3 
6 33 11 1 2 
7 403 76 7 8 
8 50 9 1 2 
9 101 14 1 2 
10 192 43 5 5 
11 133 19 1 2 
12 106 18 2 2 
13 115 27 2 3 
14 109 19 2 2 
15 171 37 4 4 
16 59 17 1 2 
17 41 5 1 2 
18 72 8 1 2 
19 59 12 1 2 
20 137 31 2 3 
21 129 16 1 2 
22 96 23 1 2 
23 112 26 2 2 
24 120 16 1 2 
25 72 22 1 2 
26 73 13 1 2 
Total 4,740 911 98 108 
Table 1.1 provides summary statistics about the mobility of managers in the sample. Panel A indicates how many 
managers moved between banks. Panel B shows the groups formed using the AKM method to identify the manager 
fixed effects. All banks and managers within a certain group are connected by at least one moving manager. 
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Using the 98 moving managers, we are able to form 26 groups including all connected 
managers and banks.  The largest connected group consists out of 33 banks including 299 
managers.  This illustrates the main advantage of the AKM method: a large amount of 
connectedness out of a relatively low amount of mobility (Abowd et al., 2002). 
Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for manager and firm characteristics and compares 
the full sample (including all banks where we can obtain manager information) with the AKM 
connectedness sample and the Mover sample that includes only managers who switch their 
employer at least once during the sample period.  The average manager in the AKM sample is 
54.29 years old and works 5.48 years with each bank.  An average tenure of 5 years should suffice 
for top managers to affect banks’ accounting decisions.  The observable executive characteristics 
in the full sample are, with an average executive’s age of 53.83 and a tenure of 4.48 years, 
comparable, but still statistically significantly different at the 1% level. In addition, managers in 
the AKM sample receive a slightly higher salary (6.04 vs. 5.83, p<0.01) but a slightly lower bonus 
(3.36 vs. 3.76, p<0.01) compared to the full sample which relates potentially to the slightly larger 
size of AKM sample banks versus banks in the full sample (9.98 vs 9.82, p<0.01).  However, risk 
taking incentives are fairly similar with an insignificant difference in compensation Delta and a 
difference in compensation Vega of -0.12 (p<0.05) between full and AKM sample.  When 
comparing the AKM connectedness sample to the mover sample, we document that managers 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B shows descriptive statistics for all categorical time-invariant manager variables. On 
average there are 33% CEOs, 11% CFOs and 10% other top-tier executives (e.g., CIO, COO, CRO) 
in the connectedness sample. 93% of the executives are male.  Again, the full sample differs only 
slightly, whereas the mover sample records a significantly higher proportion of CEOs (46%) and 
more highly educated managers (13%). 
Panel C shows descriptive statistics for bank level characteristics. Again, the connectedness 
sample is representative of the full sample, except that banks in the connectedness sample are 
somewhat bigger (9.98 vs. 9.82, p<0.01), have a slightly lower market-to-book ratio (1.72 vs. 1.88, 
p<0.01), and lower absolute discretionary loan loss provisions (-7.04 vs. -6.93, p<0.01).  When 
comparing the AKM sample to the mover sample we find that banks in the mover sample are on 
average larger than AKM banks (10.35 vs. 9.98, p<0.01) and have a higher market-to-book ratio 
(1.72 vs. 1.79, p<0.01).  
Overall, the AKM sample seems to be fairly representative of the full sample.  However, 
the descriptive statistics indicate that particularly moving managers differ significantly in terms of 
age and compensation from non-movers.  Furthermore, moving managers seem to work for bigger 
banks with higher market-to-book ratios.  Therefore, relying solely on moving mangers could lead 




1.5.2.  Results 
We start our individual manager analysis with descriptive pooled OLS regressions on 
discretionary loan loss provisions. We subsequently add compensation characteristics, observable 
manager attributes and firm fixed effects to the model in order to test whether these variables help 
in explaining variation in loan loss provisioning choice.  Precisely, we estimate the following 
pooled OLS benchmark model: 
(3) 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑃j,𝑡 = 𝑋𝑗,𝑡𝛽 + 𝑊𝑗,𝑡 𝛾 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜀j,𝑡 
 𝑊𝑗,𝑡 represents time-varying firm and manager characteristics and includes the market-to-
book ratio, size, regulatory capital, age and tenure. Furthermore, we include year fixed effects (𝜇𝑡). 
We then subsequently add categorical Manager Attributes (CEO, CFO, Top Executive, Male, High 
Education), Compensation (Salary, Bonus, Delta and Vega) and Firm Fixed Effects. We then 
compare how the inclusion of these sets of variables changes the adjusted R² of the model. 
However, we cannot add and consistently estimate manager fixed effects in this simple OLS model 
without applying the AKM sampling technique.  That is, our first analyses are purely descriptive 
as we are likely capturing some unobserved manager heterogeneity in particularly when including 
firm fixed effects.  
We start with a benchmark model including only time-varying firm characteristics and time 
fixed effects.  This model explains approximately 23.7% (adjusted R²) of the variation in 




Table 1.3 Manager attributes, controls, fixed effects and the adjusted R² 
      
Panel A: Adjusted R² in regressions on DLLP           
  Total Adj. R² Difference to Benchmark   
1 Benchmark Model (Controls) 23.7% -   
2 Benchmark + Compensation 28.8% +5.1%***   
3 Benchmark + Manager Attributes 24.2% +0.5%   
4 Benchmark + Compensation + Manager Attributes 29.8% +6.1%***   
5 Benchmark + Compensation + Firm Fixed Effects 49.6% +25.9%***   
   
Panel B: Comparing different fixed effect structures in regressions on DLLP     
  OLS Firm FE Manager FE Mover Method AKM 
            
Regulatory Capital 0.158 -0.677 0.039 -3.121* -0.065 
  (0.23) (-0.91) (0.05) (-1.91) (-0.08) 
Size 0.263*** -0.166 0.071 0.189 -0.012 
  (3.40) (-0.62) (0.40) (0.24) (-0.03) 
MtB -0.148 -0.929*** -0.859*** -1.042** -0.864*** 
  (-0.53) (-3.68) (-3.10) (-2.45) (-2.94) 
Vega -0.166** -0.150** -0.122 -0.226 -0.127 
  (-2.12) (-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.18) (-1.54) 
Delta -0.468*** -0.346*** -0.633*** -0.404 -0.627*** 
  (-4.82) (-3.67) (-3.37) (-1.27) (-2.99) 
Tenure 0.050* 0.054*** 0.105*** 0.004 0.073 
  (1.78) (2.68) (2.76) (0.06) (1.15) 
Age 0.011 0.013* -0.034 0.220 -0.066 
  (1.03) (1.70) (-0.33) (0.41) (-0.56) 
N 4,740 4,740 4,740 780 4,740 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
Manager fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
R² 29.6% 51.4% 60.7% 69.3% 62.3% 
Adj. R² 29.2% 50.0% 51.0% 58.1% 51.9% 
Panel A of Table 1.3 shows the adjusted R² for different regressions on signed discretionary loan loss provisions. The 
difference in R² relative to the benchmark model is based on the Vuong (1989) test, using robust standard errors 
clustered by bank (Wooldridge, 2010). The benchmark model regresses DLLP on a set of time-varying control 
variables: Regulatory Capital, Size and Market-to-Book ratio, Tenure, Age and time fixed effects from Table 1.2. 
Benchmark + Compensation adds Salary, Bonus, Delta and Vega to the explanatory variables of the benchmark model. 
Benchmark + Manager attributes adds all categorical manager variables: CEO, CFO, Other Top-Executive, Male, 
High Education to the benchmark model. Panel B reports coefficient estimates for regressions of signed discretionary 
loan loss provisions on time-varying firm and manager covariates using different fixed effect structures: without 
manager and firm fixed effects (OLS), including only firm fixed effects (Firm FE), including only manger fixed effects 
(Manager FE), a spell fixed effect for all executive-firm combinations (Spell FE), the Mover Method from Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) including manager and firm fixed effects, and the AKM method including manager and firm fixed 
effects. All other variables a. t-statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered by bank. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Adding compensation incentives (Delta, Vega) increases the benchmark adjusted R² to 
28.8% (+5.1%, p<0.001 11 ), whereas adding observable manager characteristics instead (age, 
tenure, gender, occupation, education, recession) does not significantly change the benchmark 
model adjusted R² (+0.5%). Including both, compensation and manager characteristics, increases 
the adjusted R² to 29.8% (+6.1%, p<0.001).  However, when we add firm fixed effects to the 
benchmark and compensation model this increases the adjusted R² to 49.6% (+25.9%, p<0.001) 
documenting a substantial impact of unobservable firm heterogeneity for loan loss provisions.  
Without taking the interrelation of firms and managers into account, these results could appear as 
indicator for a very low impact of observable manager characteristics on loan loss provisions 
compared with firm fixed effects.  However, the stark impact of firm fixed effects rather highlights 
that it is important to tease out the proportion of the firm effect that is attributable to idiosyncratic 
manager differences.12   
We continue in Table 1.3, Panel B with an evaluation of four different fixed effect structures 
for regressions of discretionary loan loss provisions on time-varying manager and firm 
characteristics (equation [2]).  We start with a pooled OLS regression that includes only time fixed 
effects (adjusted R² 29.2%).  Adding firm fixed effects increases the adjusted R² to 50%. Adding 
manager fixed effects increases the adjusted R² by an additional 1% (unadjusted +9.3%) to 51%.   
 
11  The difference in R² relative to the benchmark model is based on the Vuong (1989) test, using robust standard errors 
clustered by bank (Wooldridge, 2010). 
12  Adding time-invariant manager characteristics to this specification is not possible in a meaningful way because many 
managers stay at the same firm and, unless the AKM or mover method is used to ensure the effects are identified, it 
is not possible to estimate the manager effect unbiased. 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































When we employ the mover method and include time, firm, and manager fixed effects, the 
adjusted R² increases to 58.1%.  Using the AKM method the adjusted R² is 51.9%.  While the slight 
increase in the adjusted R² for the latter two models points at a high overlap between manager and 
firm effects, the majority of the increase in explanatory power is attenuated by the degrees of 
freedom adjustment for the high number of manager fixed effects that also results in large 
differences between raw R² and adjusted R².  Overall, the five different fixed effect specifications 
indicate that idiosyncratic manager effects seem to add explanatory power to models of loan loss 
provisions. 
In addition to the differences in explanatory power, the inference from the coefficient 
estimates varies across model specifications.  Whereas the mover method regression suggests that 
only the market-to-book ratio has a significantly negative association with loan loss provisions, the 
AKM regression additionally documents a negative association between discretionary loan loss 
provisions and mangers’ compensation Delta.  These differences could either document a different 
relationship between compensation incentives in the two samples or simply be resulting from a 
much more restricted mover sample that includes only 780 observations compared to 4,740 
observations within the AKM sample.  
We proceed by documenting the statistical and economic significance of manager fixed 
effects from the different model specifications.  Table 4, Panel A, provides F-statistics for manager 
fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and the combination of both.  We find that employing the AKM 
method, all fixed effects are statistically significantly different from zero at the 1% level. When we 
employ the mover method, we document that manager fixed effects individually are not 
significantly different from zero.  That is, relying on the mover method would lead to different 
conclusions about the statistical relevance of managers for discretionary loan loss provisions. 
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Given the statistical significance of manager fixed effects under the AKM method, we 
continue by exploring the relative economic importance of manager fixed effects for loan loss 
provisions.  We use the following R² decomposition from Graham et al. (2012) to explore the 
partial explanatory power of manager relative to firm fixed effects and other time-varying 
covariates:  
(4)  𝑅2 =
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑗𝑡,?̂?𝑗𝑡)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑗𝑡))
















    
In equation (4), we decompose the variation in discretionary loan loss provisions in its 
different components. In particular, we investigate the explanatory power of manager and firm 
fixed effects, covariates, and residuals for discretionary loan loss provisions by exploring the 
covariance between these three components with discretionary loan loss provisions, normalized by 
the variance of discretionary loan loss provisions.  Therefore,  
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑦𝑗𝑡,?̂?𝑖)
𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐿𝑛(𝑦𝑗𝑡))
 represents the fraction in 
discretionary loan loss provisions that is explained by the manager fixed effect.   
Table 1.4, Panel B, reports the partial explanatory power for manager and firm fixed effects, 
time-varying characteristics, and residuals.  The results confirm our hypothesis that individual 
managers have a major influence on loan loss provisions.  Employing the AKM method, we 
document that the 910 identified manager effects explain on average 19% of the variation in 
discretionary loan loss provisions whereas 12% of the variation is explained by firm fixed effects. 
When employing the mover method, we find corroborating evidence with manager fixed effects 
explaining 10.19% and firm fixed effects accounting for 24% of the variation in loan loss 
provisions.  In the model employing only (unidentified) manager fixed effects, the manager fixed 
effects account for 30.10% of the variation in loss provisions, potentially picking up omitted firm 
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characteristics.  Overall, these findings document a substantial impact of managers on discretionary 
loan loss provisions. Furthermore, when we explore the underlying distribution of the manager 
fixed effects from the AKM estimation, we find that manager fixed effects are almost normally 
distributed showing a significant variation across managers (untabulated). 
We next strengthen the robustness of our tests. Therefore, we explore whether the results 
are sensitive to the type of included bank managers by exploiting a subsample incorporating C-
level managers only. Table 1.4, Panel C, documents that although the sample size is much smaller 
with 196 C-level managers, the explanatory power of manager fixed effects stays largely constant 
(partial R²=19.92%) while the firm fixed effect is attenuated to less than 1% (total R²=48.16%).  
To further strengthen the robustness of the manager fixed effect estimation, we rerun the AKM 
analysis with several additional restrictions in Table 1.5.   
Prior studies examining manager fixed effects raise the concern that these effects are 
potentially driven by random events during executives’ tenure (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; 
Choi et al., 2015) or endogenous managerial turnover (Fee et al., 2013).  Although, this would 
affect our results only if employer-employee matching is based on time-varying characteristics that 
are not included in the model specification, we address remaining concerns of endogenous sorting 
of managers and banks with a subsample analysis including only plausibly exogenous executive 
transitions (Fee et al., 2013).  However, managers are replaced only in rare cases due to obvious 
exogenous reasons such as predecessor death.  Following Custodio and Metzger (2014) we collect 
plausibly exogenous manager turnovers from retirements. We consider turnovers classified as 
“retirement” in ExecuComp or that happen at the age of 61 or older as routine turnovers that are 
more likely to be exogenous than a result of the bank replacing a manager in favor of hiring a 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5 documents the robustness of our findings to this more restrictive sample selection. 
Although we can only identify 120 of such plausibly exogenous turnovers, the partial explanatory 
power of manager fixed effects for discretionary loss provisioning increases to 38% (p-value<0.1), 
whereas firm fixed become statistically insignificant.  Therefore, the inference from plausibly 
exogenous turnovers supports our prior finding that managers explain a substantial proportion of 
the variation in discretionary loan loss provisions, alleviating endogeneity concerns. 
We perform four additional robustness tests with different subsamples.  First, we ensure the 
consistency of our manager fixed effect estimates by including only firms with at least two movers 
per bank, and using only the largest connected group for the estimation.  Second, we alleviate 
concerns that extreme events such as the financial crisis or duration of the sample period affect our 
results by first restricting the sample to the 2001-2014 period, and second, excluding the financial 
crisis years from 2007-2009.  We continue to find that manager fixed effects significantly affect 
bank’s loan loss provisioning in all robustness tests, although the economic magnitude of the 
manager effects varies slightly between 18% and 23% (p-value<0.01-0.052). 
Overall, our results confirm that manager fixed effects play an economically and 
statistically significant role in explaining discretionary loan loss provisioning with a partial 
explanatory power of approximately 19%. In comparison, time-invariant bank characteristics 
explain on average 12% of the variation in discretionary loan loss provisions while further 31% of 
the variation are explained by control variables13.   
 
13  The remaining proportion is not explained, therefore reflects the partial explanatory power of residuals. The high 
explanatory power of control variables is partly attributable to time fixed effects, added to the time-varying controls 
category to avoid overcategorization. 
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1.6.  Management styles and the LLP choice 
1.6.1.  Research design 
In the next step of our analysis, we explore whether bank manager’s decision making affects 
various bank policy choices in a systematically related way.  We start by investigating whether 
bank managers fixed effects explain variation for other bank policy choices beyond loan loss 
provisions. Specifically, we estimate equation (2) using manager’s compensation incentives, and 
loan portfolio choices as dependent variables. We employ Vega, Delta, and total Pay as dependent 
variables in equation (2) to capture manger’s intrinsic talent and their risk-preferences from their 
market-based compensation (Graham et al., 2012; Albuquerque et al., 2013; Francis et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, we capture manager’s idiosyncratic influence on the loan portfolio employing the 
Loan-to-Deposit ratio (LtD), the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL) and the ratio 
of loans to total assets (Loans).  Banks with a higher proportion of loans naturally own less 
securities, and usually follow a more traditional banking business model (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012).  
Furthermore, LtD captures whether loans are funded with deposits or other potentially riskier 
sources of funding (Laeven and Levine, 2009).  The non-performing loan ratio captures bank’s 
non-performing loan classifications as a third important loan portfolio characteristic (Ghosh, 2015). 
We employ the AKM method to estimate the manager fixed effects for these six additional policy 
choices and to determine how much of the variation is explained by mangers idiosyncratic 
influence. 
In the next step, we explore whether we find significant correlations across these individual 
manager styles for certain bank outcomes. For example, do managers that exert a high influence 
over banks loan loss provision also affect non-performing loan classifications?  Or do managers 
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with a higher preference for risk-incentivized compensation also express a preference for more 
discretionary loan loss provisions? We analyze the correlation structure between manager fixed 
effects in the to answer these questions. We then investigate whether individual observable 
characteristics explain manager fixed effects and whether we find overarching patterns how 
observable manager characteristics influence managerial styles.  While many time-invariant 
characteristics such as ability, talent or personality are likely difficult to quantify, exploring which 
observable factors play a role for bank manager’s accounting and policy decisions is key to the 
enhance the understanding of the role of manager characteristics for accounting decisions. 14  
Therefore, we estimate the following cross-sectional regressions to test the influence of observable 
manager characteristics for the accounting and policy choices: 
(4) 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑘 = 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖,𝛽 + 𝜙𝑘 + 𝜀i,k 
Where i denotes managers and k denotes the AKM estimation group in which we estimated 
the manager effect. 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸𝑖,𝑘  is the manager fixed effect from the eight different AKM 
regressions (equation 2), employing discretionary loan loss provisions (signed and unsigned), 
Vega, Delta, Total Pay, Loans, Loans-to-Deposits, and Non-Performing Loans as dependent 
variables. 15   Manager Characteristics includes demographic variables (Male, Recession 
Executive), occupational status (CEO, CFO, Top Executive), education (Higher Education), and 
average risk-taking incentives (Average Delta, Average Vega, Overconfident). In addition, we add 
AKM estimation group fixed effects (𝜙𝑘) to account for differences in the estimation group. This 
is appropriate because manager fixed effects are estimated within groups of connected managers 
 
14  Graham and Liu (2012) interpret manager fixed effects with management ability and talent, but note that manger 
fixed effects capture also all other time-invariant individual attributes. 
15  All Variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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and banks and are always estimated relative to the within group before we normalize them. In 
addition, we cluster standard errors on the bank level to account for any correlations in managerial 
characteristics at the bank level.  
Male is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for managers that are male. 
Evidence on the influence of gender on corporate decision making is mixed. While Ge et al. (2011) 
do not find a significant relation between gender and earnings management, Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) document that female executives are more likely to make risky and overconfident corporate 
decisions.  In contrast, Francis et al. (2015) find that female CFOs tend to increase accounting 
conservatism compared to their male peers. Given the mixed evidence on the influence of gender 
on accrual quality, we make no ex ante prediction about the influence of gender on loan loss 
provisions.  
Recession Executive is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the manager started 
her career during a NBER-defined recession.  Schoar and Zuo (2017) document that an executive’s 
management style depends significantly on the market conditions present when the executive enters 
the labor market.  Their results indicate that CEOs who enter the labor market during a recession 
exert a conservative management style with respect to R&D expenditures, capital expenditures and 
leverage. Because the career start date is endogenously determined and affected by economic 
cycles, we follow their methodology to identify recession executives.  First, we add 24 years, the 
average age of starting to work at the first position, to the executives’ birth date.  Second, we 
classify an executive’s first year on the labor market as recession year if it falls at least six months 
into a National Bureau of Economic Research-defined recession.   
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In addition, we include binary indicator variables for the exact occupation of the manager 
denoting whether the manager is either a CEO, a CFO or another C-level Top Executive. While it 
is ex-ante unclear whether CEOs, CFOs or other top executives have the greatest impact on loan 
loss provisions, prior literature suggests that CFOs play an incremental role for earnings 
management in non-banks (Jiang et al., 2010).   
To test if education explains variation in managers’ fixed effects, we collect the highest 
degree of the executive and create a binary indicator variable (Higher Education) that takes the 
value of one for all managers that have a PhD, MBA or CPA qualification.  Education is frequently 
employed as a proxy for talent among workers (e.g. Abowd et al., 1999). Furthermore, Bertrand 
and Schoar (2003) document a positive impact of managers with MBA qualification on corporate 
performance. Nevertheless, prior evidence from Ge et al. (2011) indicates that having a MBA or 
CPA qualification does not significantly affect accounting styles in non-banks. 
Furthermore, we proxy for managers’ risk-taking incentives using managers average equity 
compensation (average Vega and average Delta) incentives over her career.  While Vega 
theoretically provides clear risk-taking incentives, option Delta has two countervailing effects 
(Armstrong et al., 2013).  On the one hand, delta incentives risk-taking by rewarding managers 
with wealth increases if the stock price accelerates.  On the other hand, a higher Delta 
simultaneously exposes managers’ wealth to a higher stock-price risk which should reduce risk-
taking.  Important to note here is that we use manager’s average Delta and Vega over their whole 
sample period while we tease out the time-varying effect of both variables within the AKM 
estimation.  
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We include overconfidence as an additional proxy for managers risk-taking incentives. We 
employ a binary indicator variable that takes the value of one for managers who do not exercise 
stock options that are more than 67% in the money (Campbell et al., 2011).  Overconfident 
executives are associated with overly optimistic forecasts (Hribar and Yang, 2016) and have a 
higher likelihood of intentional misstatements (Schrand and Zechman, 2012).  
1.6.2.  Results  
We first document that managers impose a significant influence over all examined corporate 
decisions.  Table 1.6, Panel A, shows that manager fixed effects explain between 11.26% and 
50.28% of the variation in managements’ policy and accounting styles.  Managers fixed effects 
seem to matter in particular for compensation and loan portfolio choices.  In the next step, we 
analyze the correlations across the manager effects for the different corporate decisions. Panel B 
reports the pairwise correlations documenting that loan loss provisioning styles are highly 
correlated with managements’ idiosyncratic preferences for compensation-based risk-taking 
incentives (Vega, Delta, Total Pay) and non-performing loan classifications.  This indicates that a 
manager’s loan loss provisioning style is associated with preferences for other important corporate 
policy choices.  
Along these lines, we explore in Panel C whether the correlation in management styles 
across different corporate decisions is also reflected in observable manager characteristics that are 
captured in the manager fixed effects. To test whether observable manager characteristics affect 
corporate choices in a systematic way we regress the manager fixed effects for the corporate choice 
on different (time-invariant) observable individual characteristics capturing demographics, 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We find no significant association between managers’ gender, education, prior crisis 
experience and loan loss provisioning styles.  However, male managers seem to express a 
preference for more risk-taking in the form of higher compensation Vega and Delta.  Although 
consistent with prior evidence, given the relatively low number of female managers in our dataset, 
this finding is not necessarily generalizable to all female managers. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that the manager’s exact occupation matters.  We 
document that CEOs impose the highest influence over (absolute unsigned) loan loss provisions.  
In addition, we find that CEOs on average manage loan loss provisions upward whereas CFOs have 
an opposing negative influence on provisions.  This finding extends prior evidence documenting 
that CFOs play an incremental role for earnings management (Jiang et al. 2010).  When exploring 
other management decisions, we find CEOs to exert more influence over their total pay and non-
performing loans while CFOs have on average significantly lower individual effects on 
compensation and loan portfolio characteristics such as loan-to-deposits and non-performing loan 
classifications.   
Individual risk-taking incentives also affect provisioning styles and loan portfolio choices 
significantly.  Manager’s average compensation Vega and Delta are also significantly correlated 
with manager’s influence on loan loss provisions.  Mangers with higher Average Delta exert a 
larger idiosyncratic influence on loss provisions whereas managers with higher average Vegas 
manage loan loss provisions less.  However, managers with higher average compensation Vega on 
average influence the loan loss provision downwards. Because we tease out the time-varying effect 
of compensation incentives in the AKM regression already, the manager fixed effects capture only 
the part of the compensation incentives that relates to manager’s inherent preferences.  Along these 
lines, we document a preference for a lower loan ratio for managers with high Vega and a less 
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loans classified as non-performing for managers with high Delta.  In addition, we do not document 
an effect of overconfident managers for absolute loan loss provisions whereas we find that 
overconfident managers on average significantly increase loan loss provisions. 
Although these results indicate that observable characteristics matter, the correlation of 
observable manager characteristics across the different accounting and policy decisions appears to 
be little systematic. One potential explanation for this relatively unsystematic correlation is that 
observable manager characteristics are unlikely to manifest themselves in isolation and are often 
highly correlated.  For instance, the choice of the highest degree of an executive is potentially 
highly correlated with other executive traits such as intelligence, ability or overconfidence.  
Therefore, we employ a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in the next step of our analysis to 
build a composite score capturing the main dimensions of all observable manager characteristics.  
Because most characteristics are captured in binary variables, we use polychoric correlations for 
the PCA.  
The PCA in Table 1.7, Panel A encompasses all manager characteristics from Table 1.6 and 
identifies five components with eigenvalues larger than one (Kaiser criterion).  In addition, we 
build a composite PCA score from these five components that intends to capture a major part of 
the variation in observable manager characteristics.  We document substantial variation in 
component scores for the individual variables across the different components indicating a 
successful variance reduction.  In Table 1.7, Panel B, we then substitute the individual 
characteristics from equation (4) with the five individual PCA components to investigate whether 
the combined variation from observable characteristics explains managerial styles for different 
policy choices in a systematically related way.  The individual PCA components and the composite 
PCA score are significantly associated with the manager fixed effect for the different bank policy 
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choices and banks loan loss provisions.  Furthermore, we find overarching patterns for the PCA 
components and the combined PCA score across the different management styles. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that although individual observable characteristics do not explain a large 
fraction of the variation in individual manager styles, in combination they are still meaningfully 
and systematically correlated with several accounting and policy outcomes. 
In the next step, we build on our findings from the prior analyses that latent managerial 
styles appear to influence an array of corporate decisions in an interrelated way by constructing 
manager profiles based on their revealed individual preferences for the eight different policy 
choices.  We cluster managers according to their manager fixed effects for the eight corporate 
accounting and policy choices to determine a set of unique manager profiles.  Using cluster analysis 
has the advantage of minimizing variance within clusters while maximizing the variance between 
clusters.  Specifically, we employ a k-means clustering analysis using the Calinski and Harabasz 
(1974) index to determine the number of clusters.  We label the groups according to the 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Table 1.8, we descriptively explore the differences in observable manager characteristics 
for the four manager clusters.  We find that managers labeled as traditionalist are on average 
younger, less likely to be overconfident, and have low risk-taking incentives from compensation, 
whereas managers labeled as artists are more likely to be overconfident, are more often highly 
educated, and have the highest compensation risk-taking incentives.  As expected there is 
significant variation across manager clusters in the combined PCA score that combines all 
observable manager differences. 
 
  
Table 1.8 Manager profiles 
 Technocrats Artists Craftsmen Traditionalists 
#Managers 253 182 329 147 
Manager Characteristics                 
CEO 0.366 0.446 0.271 0.233 
CFO 0.073 0.049 0.151 0.155 
Top Executive 0.074 0.069 0.113 0.171 
Male 0.914 0.974 0.938 0.888 
High Education (PhD, 
MBA, CPA) 
0.109 0.128 0.074 0.101 
Recession Executive 0.154 0.136 0.111 0.120 
Delta (Mean) -2.394 -1.644 -2.599 -3.084 
Vega (Mean) -3.554 -3.003 -3.375 -4.274 
Overconfidence 0.148 0.230 0.137 0.067 
Mean PCA Score 0.151 0.459 0.031 -0.302 
Age 54.834 56.836 53.017 52.257 
Tenure 4.750 6.234 5.780 4.685 
Table 1.8 provides summary statistics of the different manager profiles. Manager profiles are determined using a k-means 
clustering on all different management fixed effects from Table 6 (DLLP FE, Vega FE, Delta FE, Pay FE, Loans FE, 
LtD FE, NPL FE). The optimal number of clusters is determined by the Calinski and Harabasz (1974) index. Mean PCA 
score is the average PCA score from Table 1.7, Panel C. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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1.7.  Interaction with team composition 
1.7.1.  Research design 
In the following section we investigate whether top management team composition matters 
for bank’s loan loss provisioning decisions and how it interacts with individual management styles.  
Specifically, we explore whether different manager types influence the bank’s accounting choices 
and how the effect is altered by heterogeneity at the top management team level.  Therefore, we 
estimate the following model:  
(5) 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝛽 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑀𝑇𝑗,𝑡𝛾
+ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑀𝑇𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝜙𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 +  𝜙𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
As dependent variable we use all accounting and corporate policy choices from Table 6, 
Panel A.  Therefore, the dependent variable is the time-varying corporate choice.  
𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 denotes and indicator variable for the four unique manager types we identify 
in the cluster analysis from Table 8.  Managers labeled as ‘Traditionalist’ serve as the reference 
group in all tests.  We include a binary variable 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑇𝑀𝑇𝑗,𝑡 that indicates whether at least two 
different manager types (Technocrat, Artist, Craftsmen or Traditionalist) are represented in the top 
management team.  Furthermore, we include size, regulatory capital, and the market-to-book ratio 
to capture time-varying firm characteristics.  In addition, we include firm- and year-fixed effects 
to account for unobserved heterogeneity on the year and bank level.  In all our tests, we draw 
statistical inferences based on standard errors clustered by bank to control for time-series 
correlation (Petersen, 2009). 
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1.7.2.  Results 
We report the results for the impact of different manager types and top management team 
heterogeneity in Table 1.9.  Managers that we label as artists and technocrats exert on average a 
higher discretion over the loan loss provision after controlling for bank characteristics, year, and 
bank fixed effects.  Furthermore, artist managers are also associated with a preference for higher 
risk-taking incentives from compensation (Vega).  In addition, we document a positive baseline 
effect of Diverse TMT.  That is, team diversity does not seem to be associated with less 
discretionary loss provisions per se.  However, diversity is on average rather associated with 
overprovisioning than with risky underprovisioning.  Furthermore, we document that top 
management team diversity can attenuate the negative effect of technocrats and artists on loan loss 
provision quality.  This beneficial effect of top management team diversity is particularly 
pronounced in teams that include risk-seeking managers that we label as artists.  Overall, our results 
document that diversity within top management teams can moderate the significant association 
between individual manager styles and the level of reporting discretion. Therefore, top 
management team diversity can help reducing reporting discretion for manager types that are most 
prone to making risky provisioning and loan portfolio decisions. 
  
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.8.  Conclusion 
This study explores the role of manager characteristics and top management team 
composition for banks’ loan loss provisions.  While prior literature documents that bank-specific 
incentives and variation over time shape loan loss provisions, we are the first to show a significant 
idiosyncratic manager effect for this major accounting choice.  Nevertheless, our tests reveal that 
observable compensation and manager characteristics explain only a small fraction of banks loan 
loss provisioning behavior.  The low correlations between observable characteristics and reporting 
outcomes, however, do not imply that individual bank managers have little influence on accounting 
choices.  Managers exert influence in an idiosyncratic way through their preferences, skills, or 
values that are inherently difficult to measure but important to understand a managers’ role in the 
accounting process. 
Exploiting a large sample of connected managers and banks, we document that after 
accounting for firm and time differences manager characteristics explain approximately 19% of the 
variation in the discretionary loan loss provision.  We use plausibly exogenous turnovers as a 
setting to corroborate these findings and to document that manager fixed effects are not a mere 
outcome of firm policy changes.  Furthermore, manager styles for different corporate policies are 
systematically correlated.  For example, managers employing high discretion in the loan loss 
provisioning choice also prefer a higher level of risk-taking and, on average, a lower quality of the 
loan portfolio.  That is, managers who have a distinct impact on the loan loss provisioning do exert 
their influence on other corporate actions in a systematically related way.  Using these systematic 
correlations across manager styles we cluster managers into four unique types.  We document that 
particularly managers whom we label as artists and technocrats use discretion over the loan loss 
provision.  In addition to the individual manger effects we document that top management team 
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composition can significantly alter the impact of individual managers.  Our results provide 
evidence that top management team diversity mutes the idiosyncratic influence of managers that 
employ the most aggressive loan loss provisioning styles.  
Overall, our findings imply that bank supervisor’s focus on skills and qualifications of 
individual managers can be only partially justified by the relatively limited systematic impact that 
individual observable characteristics have on relevant corporate policies. However, the focus on 
individual managers is necessary as a large proportion of bank’s policy choices is attributable to 
individual management styles. Furthermore, idiosyncratic manager influence seems to interact 
strongly with the combination of manager types within the top management team providing some 
support for regulation to increase the top management team diversity. 
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1.9. Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
  
Manager      
Variables Description Source and computation 
Age Executives' Age in years ExecuComp 
Tenure 
Duration of the employment on the current 
position 
ExecuComp 
Male Indicator variable for male managers ExecuComp 
Salary Total fixed Salary ExecuComp: Natural logarithm of fixed salary 
Bonus Bonus ExecuComp: Natural logarithm of bonus  
Total Pay Total Salary and Bonus Execucomp: Natural logarithm of total compensation  
Vega 
Dollar change in wealth linked to a 1% increase 
in stock return volatility 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006):  
Scaled with total cash compensation and log 
transformed (Edmans, 2009) 
Delta 
Dollar change in manager’s  
wealth to changes in a bank’s stock price 
performance 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006):  
Scaled with total cash compensation and log 
transformed (Edmans, 2009) 
CEO Indicator for manager’s occupation Execucomp/Boardex 
CFO Indicator for manager’s occupation Execucomp/Boardex 
Top 
Executive 
Indicator for manager’s occupation 
Execucomp/Boardex:  Top 5 executive classified as 
CEO,CFO,CRO,CIO or COO 
Recession 
Executive 
Indicates managers that started 
their career during a recession 




Indicator variable for managers with  




Indicator for overconfident managers 
Indicator for unexercised stock options more than 
67% in the money 
Bank     
Variables Description Source and computation 
MtB Market to book ratio 
Compustat: Market value of equity divided by the 
book value of equity(common shares 
outstanding*price/common equity) 
Size Size Compustat: Natural logarithm of total assets 
LLP Loan loss provisions 




Tier 1 regulatory capital Compustat: Natural logarithm of tier 1 capital 
NPL Non-performing loans 
Compustat: Non-performing loans scaled by lagged 
total loans 
CO Charge-offs Compustat: Charge-offs scaled by lagged total loans 
ALW Allowance for loan losses Compustat: Loan loss allowance scaled by total loans 
EBLLP Earnings before loan loss provisions 
Compustat: (Earnings + loan loss provisions) scaled 
by lagged total loans 
LtD Loans-to-Deposits Compustat: Total loans scaled with total deposits 
NPL Non-performing loans ratio 
Compustat: Non-performing loans scaled with total 
loans 
Loans Total loans ratio Compustat: Total loans scaled with total assets 
HPI House price index Federal Housing Finance Agency 




Do Supervisory Disclosures Lead to Greater Bank Transparency?  
The Role of Enforcement and Market Discipline 
 
 
“One of the outcomes we expect from these tests is to dispel this fog that lies over bank balance 
sheets in the Euro area and in Europe.” 
 Mario Draghi, 23/10/2013, in a speech to the European Parliament 
2.1.  Introduction 
Supervisors can influence the reporting behavior of supervised firms through different 
channels.  Their public enforcement relies on direct interventions such as comment letters, 
supervisory instructions, or fines (Jackson and Roe, 2009).  However, they can also disclose private 
information to the public to increase market attention and encourage third-party monitoring (Duro, 
Heese, and Ormazabal, 2019).  Such supervisory disclosures can also serve as a commitment device 
to assure supervisory discipline (Bushman and Williams, 2012; Dudley, 2009).  In the banking 
industry, the role of supervisory disclosures about the financial health, risk, and transparency of 
regulated banks is controversial (Goldstein and Sapra, 2014).  Enhanced disclosures equip market 
participants with a better understanding of bank fundamentals and thus help establish market 
discipline (Berger, Davies, and Flannery, 2000; Flannery, 2001; Herring, 2004), but increased 
transparency potentially mitigates opportunities for regulators to practice forbearance behind the 
scenes (Gallemore, 2019; Skinner, 2008).  Therefore, ex ante it is not clear whether supervisory 
reporting preferences are in line with market demand for bank transparency, and how supervisory 
disclosures interact with traditional enforcement in increasing bank transparency. 
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The European Central Bank’s (ECB) Asset Quality Review (AQR) provides a useful setting 
to explore the financial reporting preferences of bank regulators and the complementary roles of 
traditional enforcement and supervisory disclosures. In the run-up to the European Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which shifted the responsibility for the prudential supervision of 
the most significant Eurozone banks from national regulators to the ECB, the ECB reassessed the 
audited financial statements of each affected bank and published its findings.16  For example, the 
ECB revealed that it viewed banks’ loan loss allowances to be understated by, on average, 25% 
(median: 8%).  However, most of the AQR adjustments were not due to formal violations of 
accounting rules, but rather signaled a shift in supervisory reporting preferences within a common 
accounting framework, with the ECB generally preferring higher levels of provisioning than the 
national supervisors previously in charge of bank supervision.  
This paper explores the effect of these changes in the reporting preferences of the 
responsible supervisor and the corresponding supervisory disclosures.  In particular, we address 
three research questions. First, we examine whether banks adjust their reporting behavior following 
the change of their responsible supervisor and the public assessment of their asset quality.  Second, 
we investigate whether the change in supervisory responsibility is also associated with the market 
perception of bank transparency as reflected in lower information asymmetry and greater market 
liquidity.  Third, we compare how the changes in reporting behavior and perceived transparency 
relate to both the shift in supervisory authority and third-party market monitoring. 
We exploit the data made available by the ECB as part of the AQR exercise to address these 
questions. These supervisory disclosures provide a relatively clean measure of firm-level 
 
16  In addition to the Asset Quality Review, this Comprehensive Assessment (CA) included a stress test. 
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differences in regulatory reporting preferences, and ultimately regulatory scrutiny, between the 
prior national supervisors and the ECB.  This is important because, across the board, the ECB is 
not a stricter supervisor per se.17  The availability of a firm-level measure of changes in regulatory 
scrutiny differentiates our paper from prior studies on the effect of supervisory characteristics on 
bank reporting. Observable differences across regulatory regimes used in the literature are likely 
not only driven by supervisory characteristics, but also by macroeconomic conditions, idiosyncratic 
portfolio choices, and reporting incentives (Costello, Granja, and Weber, 2020; Nicoletti, 2018).  
Even for intra-firm changes in supervisory institutions, differences in supervisory characteristics 
need not uniformly affect supervised institutions (Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, and Trebbi, 2014; Granja 
and Leuz, 2019).  For example, small banks with a straightforward business model can be 
supervised equally well by regulators with and without extensive resources.  Similarly, concerns 
about regulatory capture that result from reputational concerns or future employment opportunities 
plausibly differ in the cross-section of banks. 
In the first step of our analyses, we employ a panel of yearly bank-level accounting data 
over the period from 2011 to 2017 (i.e., three years before and three years after the introduction of 
the SSM in the Eurozone). To examine banks’ reporting behavior, we focus on changes in loan 
loss provisioning and the classification of non-performing loans.  Our research design benefits from 
the national regulators remaining responsible for the supervision of non-SSM banks.  We include 
all other European banks that overlap in size with the SSM treatment sample as a benchmark group 
 
17  For example, Nordea, the largest bank in Sweden (which is not part of the Eurozone), relocated its headquarters 
from Stockholm to Helsinki in late 2018 in a conscious effort to fall under SSM supervision instead of the 
Swedish Finansinspektionen (Financial Times, 2017). 
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to enable a difference-in-differences estimation that controls for general time trends and macro-
level shocks.  
Controlling for changes in the underlying risk of the loan portfolio, we find, if anything, a 
negative standalone effect of SSM supervision on the level of loan loss provisions and non-
performing loans.  For instance, the ratio of non-performing to total loans decreased by 1.2 
percentage points for SSM banks after becoming subject to ECB supervision, which amounts to 
about 18% of the average non-performing loan ratio of all banks in our sample period. This is in 
contrast to the common notion that the ECB is a generally stricter supervisor than the prior national 
regulators (Fiordelisi, Ricci, and Lopes, 2017), and is consistent with our understanding that the 
impact of the SSM is not uniform across all affected banks, but depends on the firm- and country-
specific divergences in supervisory policy.  Consequently, when we take the magnitude of the AQR 
adjustments into account, we find that against the negative base effect, reporting conservatism 
significantly increases with larger adjustments.  We interpret this as evidence that banks’ reporting 
choices are influenced by supervisory preferences beyond simple compliance with given 
accounting standards. 
In the second step, we estimate panel regressions of monthly bid-ask-spreads as a proxy for 
market liquidity and information asymmetry among market participants for the subsample of listed 
treatment and control firms.  We find that the SSM adoption is associated with a decrease in the 
bid-ask spreads of participating banks by about 16%.  However, when we interact the SSM 
participation with the magnitude of a bank’s AQR adjustment, we observe that this association is 
limited to those banks with greater AQR adjustments.  This finding supports the view that 
supervisory scrutiny can reduce information asymmetry and contribute to a higher level of 
perceived transparency.  
62 
In the third step, we examine the cross-sectional variation in the changes in reporting 
behavior and market liquidity around the SSM adoption more closely. In particular, to gauge the 
relative importance of enforcement and market discipline, we test to what extent the changes are 
attributable to supervisory reporting preferences (i.e., differences between the ECB and the national 
supervisor) or to the strength of market forces at the firm level. We find that the likelihood of 
political capture under local regulation and the increase in the quality of the regulatory 
infrastructure are associated with the change in banks’ reporting behavior.  Banks that are subject 
to the greatest shift in these supervisory characteristics exhibit the strongest increase in loan loss 
provisions and loans classified as non-performing.  However, we fail to find evidence that an 
increase in regulatory scrutiny per se also translates into higher stock liquidity. Instead, rather than 
with regulatory characteristics, the changes in market liquidity around SSM adoption are associated 
with the strength of third-party market monitoring through, e.g., depositors and other providers of 
bank funding.  The latter finding implies that even where supervisory action is not perfectly aligned 
with market demand for information, supervisory disclosures like the publication of the AQR 
results can stimulate market discipline and push banks to increase their level of transparency. 
Our study contributes to different streams of the literature.  First, it is related to research on 
the influence of supervisory institutions and their enforcement on reporting outcomes and firm 
transparency in general and, in particular, in the banking industry (Bischof, Daske, Elfers, and Hail, 
2020; Costello et al., 2016; Granja, 2018; Granja and Leuz, 2019; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; 
Nicoletti, 2018). We add to this literature by focusing on a clearly identified setting that is 
characterized by within-firm changes in the responsible supervisor and a firm-level measure of 
supervisory reporting preferences that captures variation in the potential impact of the reform.  Our 
results on the institutional determinants of the SSM/AQR effect are also related to the literature on 
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the consequences of intra-agency and interagency heterogeneity for regulatory outcomes (Busuioc, 
2015; Fremeth and Holburn, 2012; Macher, Mayo, and Nickerson, 2011) and on political influence 
and regulatory capture (Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David, and Dinc, 2018; Lambert, 2018). 
Second, our paper adds to the literature on the effects of supervisory disclosure. In particular 
in the banking industry, disclosures about enforcement actions or regulatory stress tests have been 
found to be informative and to elicit market discipline by investors (Petrella and Resti, 2013; 
Morgan, Peristiani, and Savino, 2014; Flannery, Hirtle, and Kovner, 2017; Fernandes, Igan, and 
Pinheiro, 2017). These disclosures can also have feedback effects on the supervisor’s choice of 
enforcement actions (Kleymenova and Tomy, 2020) and on firms’ reporting behavior (Bischof and 
Daske, 2013; Duro et al., 2019). We complement these studies by investigating under which 
conditions supervisory disclosure can facilitate changes in banks’ reporting behavior and perceived 
transparency. 
Finally, our paper adds to the topical literature on the SSM.  Prior research focuses either 
on the determinants (Acharya and Steffen, 2014; Homar, Kick, and Salleo, 2015; Steffen, 2014) or 
on the immediate market reaction to the publication of the results of the AQR and the 
contemporaneous stress test (Carboni, Fiordelisi, Ricci, and Lopes, 2017; Lazzari, Vena, and 
Venegoni, 2017; Sahin and de Haan, 2016).  Regarding the real effects of the SSM adoption, 
Fiordelisi et al. (2017) document that affected banks reduced their credit supply in the run-up to 
the SSM launch to improve their equity capital ratios.18  Our study contributes to this literature by 
 
18  Eber and Minoiu (2017) also find that banks subject to the Comprehensive Assessment adjusted their leverage, 
mainly by reducing lending and wholesale funding. Gropp, Mosk, Ongena, and Wix (2019) make a similar point 
regarding the 2011 stress test by the European Banking Authority (EBA). 
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providing evidence on how the SSM influenced the long-term transparency of supervised 
institutions. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, provide more details on the 
SSM and the AQR disclosures and develop our empirical predictions.  In Section 3, we outline the 
research design, describe the sample selection, and provide descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents 
the results of the baseline analysis of the SSM/AQR effects on banks’ accounting behavior and 
perceived transparency, and the cross-sectional tests along the dimensions of changes in 
supervisory enforcement and the intensity of market monitoring.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2. Institutional setting and empirical predictions  
2.2.1.  Bank supervision and accounting enforcement under the Single Supervisory Mechanism  
 To reinstate trust in the financial markets after the European sovereign debt crisis, 
policymakers and regulators called for a coordinated approach regarding the governance of 
financial system stability.  A major aspect of these initiatives was the integrated supervision of 
cross-border banking activities, as banking supervision was predominantly performed by national 
supervisors even for large, internationally active banking groups.19  To facilitate the harmonization 
 
19  National supervisors of cross-border banking groups were already engaging in information sharing in the form 
of “supervisory colleges” before the crisis.  These supervisory colleges were formed to foster coordination 
between the different national supervisors and were formally mandated by the EU Capital Requirements Directive 
II (Directive 2009/111/EC).  However, the degree of collaboration between national supervisors within the 
colleges varied significantly, often leading to inefficient microprudential supervision. For instance, during the 
chaotic bailout of the Fortis banking group, regulators from Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands had 
difficulties to align their actions (Financial Times, 2009).   
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of the European system of banking supervision, the Eurozone countries formally agreed to form a 
Banking Union in December 2012.   
This Banking Union consists of three building blocks: the SSM, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, and a common deposit insurance scheme.  Under the SSM, the ECB formally assumed 
responsibility as the prudential supervisor of all banks in the Eurozone as of November 2014 
(Regulation EU/1024/2013).  At the same time, the ECB automatically redelegated the supervision 
of all “non-significant” institutions back to the originally responsible national supervisors.20  The 
ECB determines the significance of a bank on a country-by-country basis depending on 
predetermined size cutoffs (total assets above EUR 30 billion or the bank being among the three 
largest financial institutions of a country) and the extent of its cross-border activities.  As such, 
with the adoption of the SSM regulation, the ECB became the direct supervisor of 120 major 
financial institutions in 18 Eurozone countries (plus Lithuania, which adopted the Euro in 2015), 
aiming to “build on the best supervisory practices that are already in place” (ECB, 2014a).  
Prudential supervision for these significant institutions is carried out by joint supervisory teams 
composed of both supervisory staff directly employed by the ECB and representatives assigned 
from the national supervisors of countries where the bank has subsidiaries or significant branches.  
To impede regulatory capture, team members rotate on a regular basis (ECB, 2018b).  Although 
the ECB sets the supervisory agenda and the joint supervisory teams are always headed by ECB 
 
20  The General Court of Justice eventually ruled that national authorities had no formal autonomous competence 
for prudential supervision of euro area financial institutions (Case T-122/15 Landeskreditbank Baden-
Württemberg vs. ECB, 2017).  However, once prudential supervision tasks were redelegated to a national 
supervisor, there was no formal accountability mechanism that would give the ECB any power to sanction the 
national supervisor besides the latent threat to reassume the role of the supervisor of a less significant institution 
in the respective country (Karagianni and Scholten, 2018).   
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staff, the teams rely extensively on the national supervisor’s existing supervisory infrastructure as 
well as on their local staff in their operations (European Court of Auditors, 2016; IMF, 2018).  
On October 26, 2014, shortly before the introduction of the SSM, the ECB and the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) released the results of a Comprehensive Assessment (CA) that consisted 
of the AQR and a stress test of major Eurozone banks.21  While the stress test gauged the banks’ 
resilience against macroeconomic shocks, the AQR involved a detailed review of bank balance 
sheets with the objective of harmonizing the measurement of banks’ risk exposures and increasing 
the quality of public information. In particular, the AQR assessed the adequacy of loan loss 
provisions, collateral valuations, and the classification of loan exposures as non-performing.  It was 
a supervisory exercise of unprecedented scale (ECB, 2014b), lasting 12 months, involving more 
than 6,000 staff, and costing nearly EUR 500 million for external auditors and consultants.  In 2015 
and 2016, the EBA carried out two more AQRs to prepare the inclusion of additional banks to the 
SSM supervisory system (2015: 13 banks, 2016: 3 banks).  Importantly, the ECB did not intend 
the findings of the AQR to trigger immediate accounting restatements, and only 8% of the 
additionally required loan loss provisions were stated to stem from actual violations of binding 
accounting rules (ECB, 2014b). Instead, the AQR adjustments revealed differences in the 
regulatory reporting preferences between the ECB and individual national regulators that originate 
from the discretion inherent to the application of financial reporting standards for loan loss 
provisioning.    
 
21  While there was significant overlap between CA inclusion and participation in the SSM, some banks did not 
become subject to ECB supervision but were part of the AQR, and vice versa.  Specifically, between 2014 and 
2017, 136 banks were included in the SSM, but seven of these were never included in an AQR.  In the AQRs, the 
ECB assessed 142 banks, but 13 of these AQR banks were never included in the SSM. Therefore, the overlap 
between SSM and AQR comprises a set of 129 banks (see Table 1 for details). 
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2.2.2. Banks’ reporting behavior around the supervisory AQR disclosures 
Formal supervisory enforcement and informal supervisory influence are an important 
determinant of firms’ reporting behavior (Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013; Gipper, Leuz, and 
Maffett, 2019; Holthausen, 2009). In the banking sector, bank supervisors tend to dominate the 
public enforcement of reporting regulation.  They have economic resources and legal powers that 
usually outmatch those of general accounting supervisors (such as the securities market regulator) 
by a wide margin (Bischof et al., 2020).  However, bank supervisors can have ambiguous 
preferences regarding bank transparency, which are not necessarily aligned with investors’ demand 
for information.  For example, supervisors prefer at least some specific banks to be opaque to 
facilitate the orderly resolution of troubled institutions, to avoid market concern, or to protect the 
supervisor’s reputation (Gallemore, 2019; Steffen, 2014). 
We expect that the transnational unification of supervisory institutions under the SSM 
affects bank reporting, beyond formal compliance with accounting standards, through a 
harmonization of these supervisory preferences.  Importantly, this effect is not necessarily uniform 
at the individual firm level, but depends on the relative divergence in supervisory reporting 
preferences between the national regulator and the ECB, which becomes manifest in the bank-
specific AQR adjustment. We therefore predict that SSM banks will adjust their accounting policies 
corresponding to the magnitude of these published accounting adjustments. 
The extent to which the ECB will intervene and enforce its reporting preferences likely 
depends on a country’s specific institutional setup, such as the sources of the national supervisor’s 
prior leniency and the national supervisor’s relative resources and bargaining power.  Supervisory 
leniency can be caused by a lack of supervisory resources, which reduces the ability to detect 
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shortcomings and to enforce corrective action (Fremeth and Holburn, 2012; Jackson and Roe, 
2009; Macher et al., 2011). At the same time, the national supervisors’ endowment and ability also 
likely determine their bargaining power in determining supervisory policies relative to the ECB, 
which initially had to rely substantially on local resources and the existing supervisory 
infrastructure (European Court of Auditors, 2016; IMF, 2018).  Against this backdrop, we predict 
that the adjustment of banks’ accounting behavior is more pronounced in countries with relatively 
weak national supervisors. 
Another important potential cause of supervisory leniency is institutional capture (Lambert, 
2018; Macher and Mayo, 2012; Stigler, 1971).  As the ECB is a relatively independent institution 
regarding the influence of individual governments or national interest groups (Loipersberger, 
2018), the SSM implementation likely mitigates such issues, and we expect that SSM banks are 
required to adjust their accounting policies more strongly in local environments that indicate prior 
capture of the national supervisor. 
In addition to the direct intervention by the supervisor, we expect that the SSM 
implementation also affects banks’ reporting behavior indirectly through market pressure that 
stems from the disclosure of the AQR results.  Such supervisory disclosure provides market 
participants with private supervisory information and allows them to impose market discipline on 
the supervised firms, which in turn can induce changes in firm behavior (Duro et al., 2019). The 
more a bank’s funding structure or the perceived threat of distress facilitate market monitoring, the 
greater we expect banks to adjust their reporting choices. 
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2.2.3. Bank transparency around the supervisory AQR disclosures 
Where the AQR adjustments match market concerns about banks’ portfolio risk 
(Carboni et al., 2017; Lazzari et al., 2017), their publication and the corresponding changes in 
reporting behavior can increase banks’ perceived transparency and, through the reduction in 
adverse selection, induce an increase in stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001).  In addition, even if the AQR adjustments are not fully 
aligned with investors’ informational needs (e.g., because they are understood simply as an 
indicator of unconditional supervisory conservatism), they can suggest a higher level of 
supervisory strictness under the SSM that might affect the perception of banks’ reporting quality 
in general. Similarly, supervisory disclosures that reveal substantial AQR adjustments likely trigger 
investor attention that extends to all aspects of financial reporting, which in turn can generate 
market pressure for banks to increase their overall level of public information.  
 
2.3. Research design and data 
In this section, we describe the empirical identification strategy and develop the regression 
models to test our main predictions regarding the effect of the SSM introduction and the 
supervisory AQR disclosures on bank’s reporting behavior and, consequently, on market liquidity.  
We then discuss the sample selection and provide descriptive statistics on our sample of European 
banks. 
2.3.1. Empirical model 
We evaluate the changes in bank reporting and transparency around the SSM adoption and 
after the supervisory AQR disclosures from two perspectives.  First, we analyze changes in banks’ 
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loan loss reporting behavior around the AQR disclosures using panel regressions with different key 
ratios from banks’ yearly financial statements as the dependent variable. Second, we examine 
whether the observed changes in reporting behavior are associated with an increase in bank 
transparency and lower levels of information asymmetry (as reflected in bid-ask spreads).  The 
analyses rely on publicly available data on the AQR adjustments.  These adjustments provide us 
with a granular and firm-specific measure of the extent to which the newly adopted supra-national 
SSM supervision reflects a change in supervisory reporting preferences (compared to the previous 
supervision by the local authority). 
In both sets of tests, we use a difference-in-differences design that exploits the size overlap 
between AQR participants and European non-SSM banks arising from the different size thresholds 
for AQR participation in the Eurozone countries (Gropp et al., 2019).  We include only non-SSM 
banks that are at least as large as the smallest SSM bank in the benchmark sample to avoid that our 
results are driven by different business models or funding strategies that are potentially correlated 
with bank size.  Our research design also benefits from the staggered introduction of the SSM from 
2014 to 2016 (with the majority of banks being included in 2014).  Together, these features allow 




To analyze banks’ reporting behavior, we estimate variations of the following difference-
in-difference regression model for a panel of yearly observations of the treatment and benchmark 
firms over the 2011 to 2017 period. 
Loss_Recognition = β0 + β1 SSM_Treated + β2 SSM_Treated * AQR + ∑ βi Controls  
+ ∑ βj Fixed Effects + ε (1) 
We employ four accounting ratios that represent the loan loss reporting behavior of banks 
as dependent variable. Specifically, we use (1) the ratio of periodic loan loss provisions to total 
gross loans (LLP Ratio), (2) the ratio of the total loan loss allowance to total gross loans (LLA 
Ratio), (3) the ratio of loan loss allowances to non-performing loans (Coverage Ratio), and (4) the 
ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans (NPL Ratio).  There are two main variables of 
interest.  First, the difference-in-difference estimator SSM_Treated is a binary indicator variable 
that takes on the value of ‘1’ beginning in the first year that an SSM bank becomes subject to ECB 
supervision.  Second, SSM_Treated * AQR captures the potentially heterogeneous treatment effect 
and is the interaction of SSM_Treated and the continuous variable AQR.  We compute AQR as the 
magnitude of the ECB’s disclosed adjustment of a bank’s loan loss provisions (scaled by the 
concurrent loan loss allowance) as a result of the Asset Quality Review.  Controls denotes the 
following lagged firm-level and macroeconomic control variables:  Size as the natural logarithm of 
total assets, RoA as the ratio of pre-provisioning income to total assets as a measure of banks’ 
profitability, Tier 1 as the ratio of banks’ tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, Cost-to-Income as 
the operating expense divided by operating income measuring banks’ efficiency, GDP as the 
annual gross domestic product growth rate in the respective country obtained from the World Bank, 
and RWA as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets as a measure of the underlying portfolio 
risk.  We add changes in non-performing loans from year t–1 to year t in regressions of loan loss 
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provisions to control for non-discretionary changes in delinquency rates.  We include year- and 
firm-fixed effects, which account for the general time trend as well as time-invariant bank and 
country characteristics (e.g., the quality of the legal system or the development of capital markets).  
As such, our fixed-effects structure subsumes factors that are specific to a certain year (e.g., the 
sovereign debt crisis).  In all our tests, we draw statistical inferences based on standard errors 
clustered by bank to adjust for time-series correlation (Petersen, 2009). 
For the liquidity analysis, we estimate the SSM effect in a similar regression model using 
a panel of monthly observations of the subsample of listed sample banks from 2011 to 2017:  
Log(Bid-Ask-Spread) = β0 + β1 SSM_Treated + β2 SSM_Treated * AQR + ∑ βi Controls  
+ ∑ βj Fixed Effects + ε (2) 
where the dependent variable Bid-Ask Spread is the monthly median quoted spread between the 
bid and ask price, and SSM_Treated is a binary indicator variable that now takes on the value of 
‘1’ for treatment banks beginning in the first month after becoming subject to ECB supervision.  
SSM_Treated * AQR is the interaction between SSM_Treated and the magnitude of the ECB’s 
disclosed adjustments of a bank’s loan loss provisions, scaled by the concurrent loan loss 
allowance.  Controls is a vector of firm-specific controls that capture additional determinants of 
stock liquidity: the absolute value of the monthly Abnormal Stock Return (based on a simple market 
model), Market Value, the monthly median of daily Share Turnover, and Return Variability 
measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns.  We estimate the liquidity regressions in 
a log-linear form with the natural logarithm of the dependent and control variables, and lag the 
control variables by 12 months.  We include country-month and firm-fixed effects to control for 
country-specific time trends as well as for time-invariant bank and country characteristics. 
73 
2.3.2. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Our sample period begins in 2011, three years before the launch of the SSM, and runs until 
2017, three years after.22  We collect annual bank accounting information from S&P Global Market 
Intelligence (formerly SNL Financial) and capital market data from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the sample selection process.  For the accounting analysis, the initial 
treatment sample includes all 136 SSM banks, of which we keep 129 banks that were also subject 
to an AQR in 2014, 2015, or 2016.  We exclude 12 banks that were nationalized during the sample 
period, and drop six more banks due to missing data on dependent or independent variables.  The 
final treatment sample comprises 111 SSM/AQR banks with 667 annual observations.   
For the control group, we begin with all 4,600 EU banks from the S&P universe that were 
not included in the SSM.  We exclude 755 banks that were either directly owned by a treatment 
bank or shared their direct or ultimate parent with a treatment bank.23  We additionally exclude 748 
banks due to missing data.  Because the AQR focused on banks with significant lending activity, 
we follow Fiordelisi et al. (2017) and exclude 233 control banks that are in the bottom fifth 
percentile of loans to total assets.   
  
 
22  From 2018, Eurozone banks that apply IFRS started to report loan loss provisions under IFRS 9’s new expected 
credit loss model, which impairs the comparability of post-2018 accounting numbers with earlier periods (when 
banks applied the incurred loss model under IAS 39). This supports our choice of the sample period. 
23  Ownership information in S&P Global Market Intelligence is static and only available for the latest respective 
update. We additionally use ownership information from the 2012 Bureau van Dijk Bankscope tape to 
complement the ownership test with earlier periods. 
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Table 2.1 Sample selection 
Panel A: Overview of AQR/SSM banks  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Year 




Overlap (1) & 
(2) 
2014 130 120 - 120 119* 
2015 9 15 6 129 9** 
2016 3 1 4 126 1 
2017 0 0 1 125 0 
Treatment Sample     129  
      
 










All SSM banks 136       
  Less:  banks not in AQR (7)       
AQR & SSM banks 129  903     
  Less: AQR Banks nationalized during sample period (12)  (84)     
AQR & SSM Banks 117  819     
All other banks in Europe with data from S&P     4,600  32,200 
  Less: Owned by a treatment bank     (755)  (5,285) 
  Less: Missing data on dependent or control variables (6)  (152)  (748)  (11,448) 
  Less: Bottom 5% TL/TA     (233)  (1,086) 
  Less: TA < smallest treatment bank     (1,297)  (6,627) 
Total Sample (accounting analysis) 111  667  1,567  7,754 
Table 2.1 Panel A shows the number of banks that participated in an AQR or became subject to the SSM. Column (1) indicates 
the number of participants in the point-in-time AQR in a given year, column (2) shows how many new banks became subject 
to ECB supervision under the SSM, column (3) indicates how many banks previously in the SSM dropped out of the SSM 
again, column (4) presents the total number of banks in the SSM in a given year, and column (5) shows how many banks 
became subject to ECB supervision under the SSM and also participated in an AQR during the sample period.*Out of these 
119 banks 5 participated in the CA in 2015 but joined the SSM in 2014. **Out of these 9 banks, 5 were assessed in 2014 but 
joined the SSM in 2015, 1 bank was assessed in 2016 but joined the SSM in 2015. Panel B illustrates the sample selection 
procedure for the treatment and the control group. The sample period includes all years over the 2011-2017 period using all 
European banks as control that are at least as large as the smallest SSM/AQR bank. We exclude banks that are owned by a 
treatment bank or that are in the bottom 5th percentile of the total loans to total assets ratio, and bank observations that have 
missing data on any control variable or all dependent variables. 
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The ECB determines on a country-by-country basis which banks are classified as 
“significant” and therefore become subject to ECB supervision. This selection is mainly 
determined by bank size (banks which exceed total assets of EUR 30 billion or are among the three 
largest financial institutions of a country).24  As such, SSM/AQR banks are on average larger than 
non-treatment banks. However, they significantly overlap with the control banks due to the 
country-specific application of the selection criteria. Following Gropp et al. (2019), we exploit this 
size overlap to construct the control group as an “overlap sample” of banks that are at least as large 
as the smallest SSM bank in the treatment sample.  This procedure alleviates concerns that we 
capture inherent differences in business models or funding strategies that stem from the size 
difference between our treatment and control group.25  After excluding banks that do not overlap 
with the size range of SSM banks, the final control group comprises 1,567 banks and 7,754 annual 
observations. We use the subsample of banks with publicly listed equity and trading data available 
on Datastream for the liquidity analysis. Using the same selection criteria as for the accounting 
analysis yields a final sample of 6,141 monthly observations for AQR/SSM banks and the control 
group. 
To establish the validity of assuming a parallel trend among our treatment and control 
group, Figure 2.1 reports the coefficient estimates for an interaction of the SSM treatment indicator 
with dummy variables for each year in the different specifications of Eq. (1), using t-1 (the year 
 
24  Additional selection criteria are a) the economic importance of the bank for the country or the EU economy as a 
whole, b) the significance of cross-border activities, and c) whether the bank receives direct public financial 
assistance. 
25  We validate our results using entropy balancing as a quasi-matching technique that alleviates concerns about 
potential differences between our treatment and control sample (Hainmueller, 2012) and that is widely used in 
recent finance and accounting research (Chapman, Miller and White, 2019; Ferri, Zheng and Zhou, 2018; Shroff, 
Verdi and Yost, 2017). Under entropy balancing, the observations in our sample are reweighted so that the 
distribution of the control variables in the control group is as similar as possible to the distribution in the treatment 
group along the first three moments (mean, variance, and skewness). The findings from this analysis are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the ones presented in the results section (see Appendix C). 
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before a bank becomes subject to SSM supervision) as a benchmark.  These coefficients are never 
significantly different from zero (at a 5% significance level) in the pre-SSM period, mitigating 





Figure 2.1 Accounting effects around SSM introduction and AQR disclosures 
      
  
The figure shows the reporting patterns around the SSM adoption and the AQR disclosures. We estimate the model in Eq. 
(1) but replace the SSM Treated coefficient with seven separate indicator variables, each marking the year relative to the first 
treatment year over the 2011 to 2017 period. We omit the indicator for year t-1, which serves as benchmark for all other 
years. The figure plots the coefficient estimates for the seven years (except t-1) together with their confidence intervals for 
loan loss provisions, loan loss allowances, coverage ratios, and non-performing loans. We include all control variables and 
fixed effects from Eq. (1) in the estimation. Standard errors are clustered by bank. 
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Panel A of Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics for all firm-level variables used in the 
accounting and liquidity regression analyses. The four dependent variables of interest in the 
accounting analysis show considerable variation in our sample.  Banks recognize annual loan loss 
provisions of 0.5% of total gross loans on average (ranging up to 5.6% at the 99th percentile), and 
the loan loss allowance covers 3.3% (1.8%) of banks’ total loans at the mean (median). The average 
adjustment to loan loss provisions disclosed through the AQR amounts to 25.9% of the loan loss 
allowance for SSM/AQR treatment banks.  Panel B of Table 2.2 breaks down the sample 
composition by country and provides detailed information on the country-level variables.  A large 
proportion of the sample banks is located in Germany and Italy, which corresponds to the 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4. Empirical results 
In this section, we first describe the baseline results of the analysis of banks’ reporting behavior 
around the SSM introduction and the corresponding AQR disclosures. Next, we examine the 
potential effect on banks’ stock liquidity as an indicator of perceived firm transparency. We 
conclude with an analysis of cross-sectional differences in the changes in reporting behavior and 
stock liquidity. 
2.4.1. Changes in financial reporting following SSM adoption 
We begin by estimating the effect of the SSM implementation and contemporaneous 
disclosure of the AQR results on different credit risk-related reporting outcomes and report our 
baseline results in Table 2.3.26  Columns (1) and (2) reveal that the adoption of the SSM is 
negatively associated with the level of loan loss provisions of participating banks. On average, loan 
loss provisions (scaled by total gross loans) decrease by 0.5 percentage points (p-value < 0.1%) 
upon SSM adoption relative to non-SSM banks, which is both statistically significant and 
economically meaningful.  However, in line with our predictions, the supervisory shift does not 
uniformly affect all banks to a similar extent.  Column (2) highlights that a bank with an average 
AQR adjustment disclosure of 25.9% decreases its loss provisions by 0.078 percentage points 
(0.003 x 0.259; p-value < 1%) less than a bank with no adjustment.  This translates to an average 
marginal increase of the loan loss provision ratio for treatment banks of 9.3%, which is 
economically meaningful.  Columns (3) and (4) report the results for banks’ loan loss allowances. 
While the average effect of the SSM adoption is also negative (-0.2 percentage points, p-
value=0.538), but statistically insignificant, we observe a marginal increase by 0.259 percentage 
 
26  The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar if we exclude 2014 as the initial treatment year, suggesting 
that we indeed measure a long-term shift in reporting behavior. 
82 
points (p-value < 5%) in the loan loss allowance for treatment banks with an average AQR 
adjustment. We draw similar inferences for the coverage ratio (the ratio of the loan loss allowance 
to non-performing loans) in columns (5) and (6).  Banks with an average AQR adjustment report 
more conservatively and increase their coverage ratios by 1.06 percentage points (p-value < 1%) 
relative to banks with no adjustment.  In columns (7) and (8), the ratio of non-performing loans 
(NPL) to total gross loans serves as dependent variable.  Treatment banks, on average, decrease 
their non-performing loan ratios by 1.6 percentage points (p-value < 1%) upon introduction of the 
SSM. However, similar to the results on loan loss provisioning, we find that those banks with 
higher AQR adjustments classify on average 0.41 percentage points (p-value < 1%) more loans as 
non-performing, suggesting that they adopted stricter guidelines in appraising their portfolio 
quality. 
Taken together, our findings reveal a substantial change in reporting behavior after the SSM 
implementation and the publication of the AQR results. Banks facing a greater adjustment of their 
loan loss provisions increase their level of loan loss provisions, loan loss allowances, and loans 
classified as non-performing subsequently relative to other treatment banks. We interpret this 
evidence as consistent with the notion that the increase in supervisory scrutiny for certain SSM 
banks, together with the disclosure of the corresponding AQR results, changed how banks report 
about their portfolio quality. 
  











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.2. Changes in liquidity following SSM adoption  
We next examine whether SSM supervision and the disclosure of the AQR results are 
associated with a higher level of perceived transparency as reflected in higher market liquidity for 
the subsample of publicly listed banks.   
In column (1) of Table 2.4, we document a significant increase in liquidity for banks that 
fall under SSM supervision.  However, column (2) reveals that the liquidity benefits are entirely 
attributable to the magnitude of the AQR adjustments.  That is, the base coefficient estimate for 
the SSM introduction becomes statistically insignificant once we include an interaction term that 
captures variation in the impact of the new supervisory regime and, correspondingly, the 
supervisory AQR disclosures. For the average treatment bank in our sample (in terms of the 
magnitude of the AQR adjustment), bid-ask-spreads decrease by about 15% relative to the control 
group after the SSM implementation, which is economically meaningful, but not too large to be 
implausible.   
Taken together, our findings suggest that those SSM banks that, relative to their prior 
national supervisors, experienced a substantial switch in supervisory reporting preferences became 
more forthcoming in recognizing problem loans, with market participants perceiving these banks 




Table 2.4 Liquidity effects following SSM introduction and AQR disclosures 
Log(Bid-Ask Spread) as Dependent Variable (1) (2) 
Test Variables:   
SSM Treated -0.185* -0.037 
 (0.054) (0.741) 
SSM Treated*AQR – -0.865** 
  (0.037) 
 
  
Control Variables:   
Log(Market Valuet-12) -0.117** -0.111* 
  (0.038) (0.052) 
Log(Share Turnovert-12) -0.057** -0.062*** 
 (0.015) (0.009) 
Log(Return Variabilityt-12) 0.025 0.032 
  (0.568) (0.459) 
Abs(Abnormal Stock Returnt) 0.250 0.253 
 (0.115) (0.113) 
  
 
Fixed Effects Firm, Country*Month Firm, Country*Month 
N 5,565 5,565 
Adj. R2 0.922 0.922 
Table 2.4 presents regression results for the effect of SSM supervision, depending on the magnitude of the AQR impact, on 
banks’ stock liquidity. The sample comprises 104 treatment and control banks with publicly listed equity. The sample period 
is from 2011 to 2017. We use the natural logarithm of a firm’s monthly median quoted daily Bid-Ask-Spread as the 
dependent variable. SSM Treated is a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of ‘1’ beginning in the first month 
that a treatment bank is under SSM supervision. AQR is the impact of the AQR adjustment on loan loss provisions (i.e., 
additionally required loan loss provisions) scaled by the amount of the loan loss allowance in the year preceding the AQR. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix B. In the regression analyses, we use the natural logarithm of Market Value, 
Share Turnover, and Return Variability, and lag all control variables by 12 months. We include country-month and firm 
fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in 
parentheses) p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by bank. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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2.4.3. Cross-sectional heterogeneity: enforcement and market monitoring  
We proceed with a closer examination of the channels that drive changes in banks’ reporting 
behavior.  First, we study the role of stricter enforcement under SSM supervision and exploit cross-
country variation in the institutional setup and in the likelihood of political capture of prior national 
supervisors before the SSM adoption.  Second, we explore the role of market monitoring in 
response to the newly available disclosures and exploit firm-level variation in the potential strength 
of market discipline.  For these cross-sectional analyses, we add an interaction term to Eq. (1) and 
(2) and estimate variations of the following difference-in-difference regression model: 
Loss_Recognition / Log(Bid-Ask-Spread) = β0 + β1 SSM_Treated + β2 SSM_Treated * Split  
+ β3 SSM_Treated * AQR + β4 SSM_Treated * AQR * Split + ∑ βi Controlsi + ∑ βj Fixed Effectsj 
+ ε (3) 
Split stands for a vector of binary partitioning variables that allow us to capture systematic 
variation in the impact of SSM supervision and the AQR disclosures among our treatment banks.  
The main effect of Split is subsumed by the firm-fixed effects, and the control variables are the 
same as defined before.  
We report the results of the cross-sectional tests in Table 2.5.  In each Panel, columns (1) 
to (5) provide the results from OLS regressions using country-level splits that are supposed to 
capture institutional features that reflect changes in enforcement strength.  In column (1), 
Regulatory Quality is a summary measure from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) to proxy for the overall quality and strength of national supervisors (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2010). We use a binary indicator that takes the value of ‘1’ for countries 
with above median regulatory quality in 2014.  We expect banks with high-quality national 
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supervisors to react less to SSM supervision because prior leniency is more likely to be driven by 
intentional supervisory policy (instead of, e.g., lack of resources or incompetence). At the same 
time, high-quality regulators have more bargaining power to assert their supervisory approach 
against the ECB, which initially had to rely substantially on the national supervisors’ resources 
(European Court of Auditors, 2016; IMF 2018). In column (2), Recession is a binary indicator for 
countries that experienced negative GDP growth during the two years before the SSM introduction. 
We assume that politicians prefer more lenient supervision during economic downturns to foster 
bank lending, which potentially conflicts with the aim of the banking regulator to promote a sound 
banking system.  The ECB as a supranational institution is likely to be politically independent and 
therefore more able to enforce its more conservative reporting preferences against opposing 
political interest (Loipersberger, 2018).  This is also the underlying rationale for the following 
variables that directly capture countries’ political characteristics. We derive the Distrust EU split 
in column (3) and the Distrust ECB split in column (4) from the answers to the 2014 Eurobarometer 
survey in each sample country. Distrust EU describes the answers to the question “Do you trust the 
EU?”; Distrust ECB describes the answers to the question “Do you trust the ECB?”.  Both variables 
are binary indicator variables that take the value of ‘1’ if a country’s percentage of “No” answers 
(indicating distrust) is above the sample median.  We expect that national supervisors experience 
political pressure towards a more lenient supervisory approach in countries where the population 
exhibits a pronounced distrust towards the EU or ECB. In the same spirit, Anti-EU Party in column 
(5) indicates whether a nationalist or euro-skeptic party had a significant influence in the national 
parliament in the respective country as of 2014.  We gather information on national election results 
from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2019) and manually collect data on missing countries.  
We define a party to be significant if it received 5% or more votes in the national elections or was 
part of the government in 2014.   
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In columns (6) to (10), we present test statistics from the OLS regressions using firm-level 
splits that are supposed to capture the strength of market monitoring and, thus, the potential role of 
market discipline in shaping banks’ reporting behavior and transparency. In column (6), Junk 
Rating is an indicator for banks with an S&P rating below BBB-.  We expect that banks with a 
speculative grade rating are subject to increased attention from their equity and debt investors 
(Freixas and Laux, 2011; Schweitzer, Szewczyk, and Varma, 1992).  In column (7), Short-term 
Funding is the ratio of deposits maturing in less than three months to total liabilities. We consider 
banks with more short-term funding to be more exposed to debt investor scrutiny (Berger and Turk-
Ariss, 2015; Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Flannery, 1994; Peria and Schmukler, 2001).  Similarly, 
Funding Cost Volatility in column (8) is the pre-treatment standard deviation of interest expenses 
to total liabilities. If debt investors learn about banks risk exposure, banks mitigate expected 
funding drains by offering higher interest rates to risk-sensitive investors (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2010; Maechler and McDill, 2006; Peria and Schmukler, 2001).  That is, we expect that 
banks with more risk-sensitive investors are subject to higher market monitoring and experience 
higher fluctuations in their funding costs.  For these three firm-level measures, we use data from 
2013, the year before the SSM introduction, to avoid potential feedback effects or problems of 
reverse causality. 
We use two additional country-level indicators of general stock market development.  In 
column (9), Listed Firms is the ratio of the number of domestic listed firms to GDP (in billions) in 
2014 from the World Bank (LaPorta, Lopez‐de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006).  In column (10), 
Equity Ownership is the proportion of total household liquid assets directly invested in the stock 
market during 2008-2010 from Christensen, Maffett, and Vollon (2019).  For both splits, we expect 
89 
that a higher demand for information in more sophisticated capital markets, and therefore a stronger 
reaction to the AQR disclosures.  
Panels A to D of Table 2.5 report the results from estimating Eq. (3) separately for each of 
the four dependent variables related to reporting behavior from Eq. (1).  The tables allow the 
following insights: We observe a significantly negative coefficient on the triple interaction of 
SSM_Treated * AQR * Regulatory Quality for all dependent variables. We interpret this result as 
consistent with the idea that an efficient national regulator can maintain its prior preferences against 
the ECB, which initially had to rely on local resources to enforce its policy.  We further find that 
the main coefficient of interest on the triple interaction of SSM_Treated * AQR * Split is generally 
positive and significant when we employ Recession, Distrust EU, and Distrust ECB (and, less 
consistently, Anti-EU Party) as indicators of potential political capture of the national supervisor.  
The incremental effect on reporting conservatism is substantive and can be up to an order of 
magnitude larger than the baseline effect of SSM_Treated * AQR.  In line with our expectations, 
these findings indicate that the impact of a change in supervisory reporting preferences on firms’ 
reporting behavior is particularly pronounced when it coincides with a material change in the 
supervisor’s institutional and political setup, pointing at the role of institutional characteristics and 
supervisory enforcement for the outcome of a given supervisory policy.   
However, we do not find conclusive evidence on the role of market monitoring in promoting 
changes in SSM banks’ accounting policies.  In Panels A to D of Table 2.5, the coefficients on the 
triple interaction of SSM_Treated * AQR * Split for the different partitioning variables in columns 
(6) to (10) are mostly insignificant, except for Junk Rating. These results suggest that the 
supervisory disclosure of the AQR adjustments did not spark market demand for corresponding 
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accounting changes, implying that such adjustments were not in line with investors’ informational 
needs after the initial AQR disclosure. 
We present the results of our analysis of cross-sectional variation in the effect on market 
liquidity in Panel E of Table 2.5.  In contrast to our findings on changes in accounting behavior, 
four of the five partitioning variables reflecting heterogeneity in the potential impact of the SSM 
introduction on supervisory enforcement in columns (1) to (5) are statistically insignificant. 
However, we find a consistent and economically substantial incremental effect in settings that 
suggest a high level of market monitoring and investor scrutiny.  We interpret these results to be 
consistent with the idea that while regulatory enforcement is effective in implementing given 
supervisory reporting preferences, firm transparency is ultimately determined by idiosyncratic 
reporting incentives and, in particular, market demand.  Our findings suggest that the supervisory 
disclosure of the AQR results was effective in generating market attention that gave rise to an 
overall higher level of bank transparency beyond an adjustment to the supervisory policy.  
Together, these results point at the important complementary role of traditional enforcement and 
supervisory disclosures in effectuating firm transparency. 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.4.4. Timeliness of the loan loss provision 
We conclude our analysis with a closer examination of the mechanisms that drive the 
observed increase in perceived transparency following the introduction of the SSM and the AQR 
disclosures. In particular, prior literature suggests that a primary determinant of bank transparency 
is the timeliness of loan loss reporting (Beatty and Liao, 2014; Bushman, 2014; Bushman and 
Williams, 2015).  Our analysis in this section borrows from prior literature and is centered on the 
association between loan loss provisions and changes in current and future non-performing loans 
as a proxy for the timeliness of the provisions (Bhat, Ryan, and Vyas, 2018; Gebhardt and Novotny-
Farkas, 2011; Nichols, Wahlen and Wieland, 2009).  Consistent with the evidence from the market 
liquidity tests, we expect that the change in the timeliness of banks’ provisioning choice is 
positively associated with the magnitude of the disclosed AQR adjustment to their loan loss 
provisions.  We estimate the following model: 
𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡 = β0 + β1 SSM_Treated + β2 SSM_Treated*AQR + β3 SSM_Treated * ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡  +  
β4 SSM_Treated*AQR* ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡  + β5 AQR* ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡  + β6 SSM_Treated* ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1   +  
β7 SSM_Treated*AQR* ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1  + β8 AQR* ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1  + β9 ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡  + β10 ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1  +  
β11 ∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1 +  ∑ βi Controls + ∑ βj Fixed Effects + ε (4) 
We regress current loan loss provisions scaled by total gross loans (𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑡) on the change in 
non-performing loans over the previous financial year (∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡) and the change in non-performing 
loans over the following year (∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1).  We interact both variables with SSM_Treated and AQR, 
defined as in model (1), to estimate the change in how timely managers incorporate information 
about delinquent loans in the loan loss provision around the supervisory AQR disclosures.  In 
addition to the control variables specified in model (1), we include the lagged loan loss allowance 
ratio (LLA) to capture banks’ prior loan loss accruals (Nichols et al., 2009) and changes in non-
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performing loans from year t–2 to t–1 (∆𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1; Nicoletti, 2018) to control for managers’ past 
expectations about loan losses.  
Our results in Table 2.6, columns (1) and (2), generally support our prediction.  While 
participation in the SSM per se appears to be associated with a decrease in timely loan loss 
provisioning, we observe an increase in timeliness corresponding to the magnitude of the disclosed 
AQR adjustments, which however is significant only for projection of losses from contemporary 
changes in non-performing loans.  
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Test Variables:   
SSM Treated -0.007** -0.006* 
 (0.037) (0.052) 
SSM Treated*AQR 0.021*** 0.004 
                                                             (0.000) (0.709) 
SSM Treated*𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡                 -0.141** -0.174*** 
                                                             (0.011) (0.009) 
SSM Treated*AQR*ΔNPLt 1.625*** 2.469*** 
                                                             (0.000) (0.002) 
   
Control Variables:   
AQR*𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡  -0.007 -0.488** 
                                                             (0.156) (0.043) 
SSM Treated* 𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1  0.196 
                                                              (0.263) 
SSM Treated*AQR*𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1  -0.767 
                                                              (0.286) 
AQR*𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1  -0.301** 
  (0.045) 
𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡  0.074*** 0.075*** 
                                                             (0.000) (0.000) 
𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡−1 0.050*** 0.050*** 
                                                            (0.000) (0.000) 
𝛥𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑡+1 -0.011 -0.011 
                                                             (0.434) (0.417) 
LLA                                                       0.006 0.006 
 (0.390) (0.387) 
Tier 1 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Size 0.002 0.002 
 (0.370) (0.387) 
Cost-to-Income -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
RoA -0.190*** -0.187*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP -0.038 -0.040* 
 (0.121) (0.088) 
Risk-weighted Assets 0.001 0.001 
 (0.753) (0.809) 
   
Fixed Effects Year, Firm Year, Firm 
N 3,298 3,298 
Adj. R2 0.664 0.664 
Table 2.6 shows regression results for the effect of SSM supervision, depending on the magnitude of the AQR impact, on 
the timeliness of banks’ loan loss provision. SSM Treated is a binary indicator variable that takes the value of ‘1’ beginning 
in the first year that a treatment bank falls under SSM supervision. AQR is the impact of the AQR adjustment on the loan 
loss provision (additionally required loan loss provisions) scaled by the amount of the loan loss allowance in the year 
preceding the AQR. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. All bank-level control variables are lagged by one year. 
We include year and firm fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. We winsorize all variables at 
the 1% and at the 99% level. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) p-values based on robust 




When the ECB became the responsible supervisor for major Eurozone banks under the 
European Single Supervisory Mechanism in 2014, it publicly disclosed the results of an extensive 
Asset Quality Review that revealed adjustments to the financial statements of these banks. 
Although these adjustments were mostly nonbinding for future bank reporting, they indicate a shift 
in the supervisory preferences about the reporting of banks’ portfolio quality relative to the national 
bank supervisors previously responsible. We use this setting to examine whether banks’ reporting 
behavior and perceived transparency changed around the shift in supervisory institutions and the 
release of the supervisory disclosures.  In addition, we explore the role of supervisory enforcement 
and market monitoring in this process. 
The supervisory AQR disclosures reveal that, on average, the ECB favored a higher level 
of reporting conservatism than the local authorities, with the adjustments representing an increase 
in the loan loss allowance for the majority of affected SSM banks. Over the following reporting 
periods, we observe that banks with greater AQR adjustments increased their level of loan loss 
provisions and classified more loans as non-performing relative to other SSM banks.  In addition, 
banks with large adjustments in the AQR also experienced a significant increase in stock liquidity 
after the SSM introduction, indicating a higher level of perceived reporting transparency. 
In a series of cross-sectional tests, we explore potential determinants of these changes. We 
find that the adjustments in banks’ reporting behavior vary with institutional characteristics of 
countries’ supervisory infrastructure that likely determine enforcement intensity. More 
specifically, the increase in reporting conservatism is particularly pronounced where the prior 
national supervisors were likely to be captured by political interest, with the takeover of 
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supervisory responsibility by the ECB constituting an increase in supervisory independence. On 
the other hand, reporting changes are less pronounced when the overall regulatory quality of the 
previous national supervisor had already been high. We attribute this finding to the joint effect of 
prior leniency being explicit regulatory policy (instead of supervisory failure) and a higher 
bargaining power of the national supervisor relative to the ECB, which initially had to rely 
extensively on local supervisory resources. Together, these results point at the important role of 
supervisory reporting preferences (beyond simple compliance with given accounting standards) 
and institutional enforcement in shaping financial reporting characteristics. 
However, we find that the observed increase in stock liquidity is associated with the 
intensity of potential market monitoring as indicated by firm-level funding structure and country-
level capital market sophistication rather than with the change in supervisory enforcement. These 
findings suggest that the supervisory AQR disclosures can facilitate transparent reporting through 
the initiation of market discipline.  Viewed collectively, our findings provide a textured picture of 
the effects of public enforcement and supervisory disclosures on firm transparency. While 
supervisory reporting preferences are an important determinant of accounting outcomes within a 
given accounting framework, supervisory disclosures can affect transparency beyond the 
implementation of a certain supervisory policy.  
The European AQR setting offers unique features, but is also subject to certain limitations.  
Perhaps most importantly, our evidence on the channels through which reporting behavior and 
market liquidity are affected comes from purely cross-sectional variation and therefore remains 
largely descriptive. Moreover, the ECB only provides the supervisory disclosures for a specific 
group of large and systemically relevant banks. While we attempt to mitigate a potential selection 
bias through our sample composition and matching procedure, our setting does not allow any 
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statements about the generalizability of our results for smaller banks that tend to receive less public 
scrutiny.  We leave these questions for future research. 
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2.6. Appendix B: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Firm-level Variables   
Tier 1  Tier 1 capital / total risk-weighted assets S&P Global MI 
Size Ln(total assets) S&P Global MI 
Cost-to-Income Ratio Operating expenses / operating income S&P Global MI 
RoA Pre-provision net income / total assets S&P Global MI 
Risk-weighted Assets  Risk-weighted assets / total assets S&P Global MI 
ΔNPL Non-performing loans /  Non-performing loanst-1  
Loan loss provisions (LLP) Ratio  Loan loss provision / total gross loans S&P Global MI 
Loan loss allowance (LLA) Ratio Loan loss allowance / total gross loans S&P Global MI 
Non-performing loans (NPL) Ratio Non-performing loans / total gross loans S&P Global MI 
Coverage Ratio Loan loss allowance / non-performing loans S&P Global MI 
Junk Rating Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for banks with 
a S&P rating below BBB- 
S&P Global MI 
Short-term Funding Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for firms with 
above median short-term deposit ratio (as of 2013) 
S&P Global MI 
Funding Cost Volatility Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for firms with 
above median funding cost volatility between 2011-2013 
S&P Global MI 
AQR Adjustment AQR adjustment on the loan loss provision (additionally 
required loan loss provisions) / loan loss allowance in 
2013  
ECB &  
S&P Global MI 
   
Liquidity Variables   
Bid-Ask Spread Monthly median of the quoted spread between the bid  
and ask price 
Datastream 
Abs(Abnormal Stock Return) Absolute abnormal monthly stock return Datastream 
Market Value Monthly median of daily market value  Datastream 
Share Turnover Monthly median of daily share turnover Datastream 
Return Variability Monthly standard deviation of daily returns Datastream 
   
Country Variables   
Distrust EU Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’  for countries 
with below median trust in the ECB as of 2014 
Eurobarometer 
Survey 
Distrust ECB Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’  for countries 
with below median trust in the EU as of 2014 
Eurobarometer 
Survey 
Anti-EU Party Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’  for countries 
with at least one Anti-EU party that is represented in the 
European Parliament with at least 5% of the seats within 
the country as of 2014 
Manifesto Project, 
Manual Collection 
Recession Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for all countries 
with negative GDP growth in the two years before the 
SSM introduction (2011 and 2012) 
World Bank 
GDP Yearly Growth in Gross Domestic Product World Bank 
Regulatory Quality Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for countries 
with above median regulatory quality over the sample 




Equity Ownership Binary variable  that takes the value of ‘1’ for countries 
with above median ratio of household equity ownership  
(2008-2010) 
Christensen, 
Maffet and Vollon 
(2019) 
Listed Firms Binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ for countries 














Test Variables:     
SSM Treated -0.003 0.002 -0.028 0.012* 
 (0.245) (0.567) (0.426) (0.067) 
SSM Treated*AQR 0.013* 0.043** -0.047 0.036** 
 (0.052) (0.012) (0.741) (0.023) 
     
Control Variables:     
ΔNPL 0.077***    
 (0.003)    
Tier 1  -0.000 -0.000 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.820) (0.329) (0.455) (0.365) 
Size 0.010*** -0.007 -0.130 0.020 
 (0.008) (0.243) (0.125) (0.175) 
Cost-to-Income -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000*** 
 (0.687) (0.557) (0.448) (0.006) 
RoA 0.065 0.584*** 1.009 1.312*** 
 (0.399) (0.004) (0.415) (0.000) 
GDP -0.001* 0.001** 0.006 -0.000 
 (0.094) (0.032) (0.162) (0.640) 
Risk-weighted Assets 0.000*** 0.000 -0.002 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.162) (0.179) (0.119) 
     
Fixed Effects Year, Firm Year, Firm Year, Firm Year, Firm 
N 4,122 6,085 4,329 4,353 
Adj. R2 0.636 0.843 0.835 0.930 
Appendix C replicates Table 3 using an entropy balanced sample. We use the entropy balancing approach to reweight 
the observations in our sample in a way such that the distribution of values of the control variables in the treatment 
group is as similar as possible to the distribution in the control group along the first three moments (mean, variance 
and skewness). We include year and firm fixed effects in the regressions, but do not report the coefficients. We 
winsorize all variables at the 1% and at the 99% level. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) 
p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by bank. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 






Legal Efficiency and Non-Performing Loans along the Economic Cycle 
“Going into the next downturn with such a high stock of NPLs is simply not an option. And NPLs 
are not just concentrated in one or two European countries; they are spread across a number of 
countries and a high number of banks. NPLs remain a European issue, no matter where the banks 
holding them are located.”  
 Danièle Nouy, 23/11/2018, in a speech to the European Banking Federation 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis and the recent economic fallout due to the corona virus focused 
a spotlight on the resilience of banks’ balance sheets and in particular banks’ non-performing loans 
(NPLs).  If a bank’s borrower gets into arrears, e.g. during economic downturns, the loan is 
recorded as non-performing27 resulting in a higher risk-weight28.  In addition, the bank might be 
required to book a provision against the potential loan loss that impairs net income and regulatory 
capital.  As a consequence, banks cannot utilize their capital for productive lending and face higher 
funding costs due to higher risk-weights.  This has severe economic consequences, as high NPL-
levels can impair bank stability (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Whalen, 1991) and hamstring bank 
lending and ultimately economic activity (Barseghyan, 2010).  Therefore, a quick work-out of 
banks’ non-performing loans, in particular after economic downturns, is key to foster lending and 
maintain bank stability.  
 
27  Typically, banks are required to record a loan as non-performing if the borrower is 90-days past due, and the 
borrower is unlikely to pay the obligation back in full (ECB, 2017). 
28  Under Basel 3, NPLs are subject to a risk weight of 150 percent when applying the standardized approach. 
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After the great financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis total NPLs in the Eurozone 
increased up to 958 billion Euro in December 2014.  While NPLs declined to 688 billion Euro in 
March 2018, the level of NPLs is still much higher than before the great financial crisis although 
most European countries were in an economic growth phase (ECB, 2019).  Therefore, regulators 
and supervisors continuously highlight the importance of NPLs and made NPL resolution a top 
priority in the recent years (e.g., IMF, 2015; ECB, 2016, 2017; ECOFIN, 2017).  However, in order 
to determine an adequate policy response, it is first necessary to understand the intertemporal and 
cross-country determinants of NPLs in the first place.   
The existing evidence on the determinants of NPLs consistently documents a negative 
correlation between economic growth and NPLs (e.g., Ghosh, 2015; Salas and Saurina, 2002).  
Taking these studies at face value one would expect that NPLs are countercyclical to 
macroeconomic conditions.  That is, NPLs increase in economic downturns and decrease in 
economic expansions. In contrast to this assumption, I observe that while all countries in Europe 
during the great financial crisis build up NPLs, some countries build up relatively persistent NPL 
stocks even within the following expansionary phases.  Therefore, it seems unlikely that economic 
growth uniformly determines NPLs over the whole business cycle.   
There are two non-mutually explanations for this phenomenon.  First, it could be that bank-
specific factors, such as profitability, regulatory capital or size are the main enablers of swift NPL 
resolution while macroeconomic factors mainly determine how NPL levels build up.  Second, the 
resolution of NPLs could be shaped by country-specific but not growth-related factors such as legal 
efficiency.  The conjecture that determinants of NPLs change across business cycles is further 
supported by anecdotal evidence from Hoshi and Kashyap (2010) who document that the nature of 
NPLs in Japan changed significantly over the economic cycle.   
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Along these lines, policymaker and regulators recognize that a successful NPL resolution 
strategy will include insolvency and judicial frameworks that allow cost and time efficient NPL 
work-outs (e.g., ECOFIN, 2017; ECB, 2016).  Although countries might have similar rules for 
contract enforcement and insolvencies, the enforcement of these rules might still depend on the 
efficiency of the legal system, such as the speed and honesty of the courts. In particular, collateral 
enforcement rules and judicial system inefficiencies, such as weak corporate and household 
insolvency frameworks that lead to slow collateral recovery represent a major risk for creditors and 
are a notable challenge to NPL resolution (ECB, 2016).  
The effect of legal efficiency on NPLs is twofold.  First, efficient debt enforcement and 
insolvency procedures can ex ante deter loan defaults by changing the borrower’s willingness to 
pay. Second, borrowers often secure loans with collateral.  If this collateral cannot be realized by 
the bank due to lengthy and expensive foreclosure procedures this deters NPL resolution and limits 
new bank lending (Haselmann, Pistor, Vig, 2010).  Against this backdrop, policymakers should 
carefully consider the recent initiatives made during the pandemic, such as the temporary 
suspension of the obligation to file for insolvency (§15a InsO) in Germany until the end of October 
2020.  This suspension could lead to an accumulation of insolvency filings after the end of the 
grace period swamping the courts.  
Even in normal times, the speed and the costs of insolvency and contract enforcement 
procedures vary significantly across countries (Djankov La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2003).  Only a few countries in Europe (e.g., Slovenia and Spain) have efficient and simple out-of-
court insolvency and enforcement mechanisms in place.  Furthermore, I expect that the influence 
of legal efficiency is likely not uniform over the NPL cycle.  While legal efficiency is unlikely to 
mitigate increased loan defaults and the building up of NPL stock during economic recessions, it 
107 
potentially contributes significantly to a fast NPL recovery process in the subsequent periods when 
economic growth picks up.  Therefore, I make the following two empirical predictions: 
Prediction 1:  Countries with high legal efficiency can reduce their NPLs earlier compared to 
countries with low legal efficiency from the beginning of an economic upturn  
Prediction 2:  High legal efficiency has an incremental negative association with NPLs during 
economic upturns, whereas macroeconomic and bank-specific factors mainly 
explain NPLs during economic downturns. 
I employ a sample from 17 different European countries to explore these questions using 
two sets of analyses.  First, I exploit the variation in the duration of NPL cycles across countries to 
explore whether legal efficiency and economic growth determine the duration of NPL cycles.  
Therefore, I test in a proportional hazard model whether (a) legal efficiency is associated with the 
duration of the increasing NPL phase and (b) legal efficiency correlates with the duration until 
NPLs decrease from the start of an economic upturn.  My findings indicate that while the duration 
of an increasing NPL phase is mainly associated with economic growth, the duration towards a 
NPL resolution from the beginning of an economic upturn is highly correlated with the efficiency 
of the legal procedures in place for contract enforcement and insolvencies.  
To test the second prediction, and to benchmark cross-country differences in legal 
efficiency with firm factors, I move to the firm-level for the subsequent analyses.  Using firm-level 
data on NPLs, I document that legal efficiency is highly correlated with NPLs even when 
controlling for several firm-level factors, such as profitability, regulatory capital and cost 
efficiency.  Exploiting variation in economic cycles across countries, I further find legal efficiency 
to be negatively associated with NPLs in economic upturns.  I confirm that this correlation is mainly 
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confined to the duration and the costs of insolvency and contract enforcement procedures and 
cannot be explained by firm factors or other cross-country differences, such as supervisory power 
or overall regulatory quality. 
I contribute to the existing literature along three dimensions. First, I acknowledge that 
associations with NPLs may change over the economic cycle.  That is, factors that matter for NPLs 
during the increasing NPL phase might not be less relevant during the reduction phase of NPLs 
and vice versa. Although there is anecdotal evidence that the nature of NPLs can change over time 
(Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010), this is, to the best of my knowledge, the first paper that distinguishes 
between different economic and NPL cycles.  Second, I contribute to the literature on the 
determinants of NPLs (e.g., Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004; Gosh, 2015) by exploring bank- and 
country-specific factors that potentially explain NPLs in Europe.  Third, I add to the literature on 
the effects of cross-country differences in the institutional set-up (Djankov et al., 2003; Djankov, 
Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer, 2008) by investigating whether insolvency and contract enforcement 
correlate with NPLs along the economic cycle.   
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, I provide a survey of the 
literature on NPLs.  Section 3 outlines the research design and describes the sample selection.  In 
Section 4, I present the results of the cox proportional hazard analysis on the country level and the 
regression analysis on the firm level to explore the duration of NPL cycles.  Section 5 concludes. 
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3.2. Literature review  
The literature on the determinants of non-performing loans can be broadly categorized into 
studies that explore (i) country-specific (mostly macroeconomic) and, (ii) bank-specific factors. 
An overarching pattern across studies of macroeconomic determinants NPLs is the documented 
negative relationship between GDP growth and NPLs (e.g., Ghosh, 2015; Salas and Saurina, 2003; 
Cerulli et al., 2019; Breuer, 2006; Beck, Jakubik and Piloiu, 2013).  Other macroeconomic 
determinants are, inter alia, exchange rates (Klein, 2013; Beck et al., 2013), foreign lending 
(Kauko, 2012), share prices (Beck et al., 2013), lending interest rates (Espinoza and Prasad, 2011, 
Louzis et al., 2011), unemployment (Ghosh, 2015; Nkusu, 2011), and house prices (Bofondi and 
Ropele, 2011; Ghosh, 2015).  However, evidence on most associations between NPLs and macro 
determinants is not fully conclusive, potentially due to the limited comparability of samples (both 
in terms of countries and time periods) and multicollinearity issues when adding highly correlated 
macroeconomic growth indicators such as GDP, house prices and unemployment to multivariate 
models.  Nevertheless, an overarching conclusion from most above mentioned studies is that 
economic growth in different facets (GDP, employment, house prices) seems to be negatively 
correlated with NPL levels.  However, none of the above mentioned studies distinguishes explicitly 
between different periods of the business or NPL cycle.   
Furthermore, the majority of the literature on NPL determinants focuses on individual 
countries, such as the US (Ghosh, 2015), Spain (e.g., Salas and Saurina, 2002), Italy (Bofondi and 
Ropele, 2011; Cucinelli, 2015; Japelli et al., 2005) Japan (Mamatzakis, Matousek and Vu, 2015), 
India (Ghosh, 2007), Greece (Louzis et al., 2011), the Czech Republic (Podpiera and Weill, 2008), 
Romania (Filip, 2014) or specific regions such as the Gulf area (Espinoza and Prasad, 2011), and 
eastern Europe (Klein, 2013; Agoraki, 2011) limiting comparability and generalizability.   
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In addition, there is evidence on the role of regulation and disclosure requirements for 
NPLs.  Barth et al. (2004) find a weakly significant negative association between private 
monitoring, strict capital requirement regulations and NPLs.  Similar results are documented by 
Agoraki et al. (2011) for supervisory power, and Breuer (2006) for off-balance sheet disclosures.  
In addition, D’Apice and Fiordelisi (2020) explore the effects of four enforcement reforms between 
2008 and 2011 on banks NPLs.  In addition, the theoretical model from Japelli, Pagano and Bianco 
(2005) shows that assuming and endogenous default rate, judicial efficiency helps to decrease the 
average default rate by fostering borrower selection ex ante.  Further descriptive evidence from a 
sample of Italian districts between 1984 and 1998 indicates that the length of the contract 
enforcement process and the backlog of cases at regional courts in Italy are correlated with NPLs.  
In addition to cross-country differences, several studies find bank-specific factors to be 
correlated with NPLs.  Against this backdrop, Berger and DeYoung (1997) document that 
decreases in cost efficiency are reflected in higher NPLs due to excess expenditures for the 
monitoring of bad loans that, however, on average come along with overall worse monitoring and 
underwriting practices.  Furthermore, their findings indicate the presence of moral hazard 
incentives for weakly capitalized banks that respond to asset quality deteriorations with an increase 
in risk-taking. Furthermore, Behr et al. (2009) and Salas and Saurina (2002) document a negative 
correlation between bank size and NPLs potentially resulting from better diversification 
opportunities.  Profitability is also frequently associated with lower NPLs for instance in Greece. 
(Louzis et al., 2011) or in Spain (Salas and Saurina, 2002). 
Overall then, several studies document that country specific and bank-specific factors 
matter for NPLs, however there is a lack of evidence on the association between legal efficiency 
and NPLs over the business cycle in Europe.   
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3.3. Research design and data 
I evaluate the development of NPLs from two perspectives.  First, I use aggregated data on 
NPLs within 17 Eurozone countries from the World Bank Global Financial Development Database.  
This database includes NPL ratios from the yearly Global Financial Stability Report published by 
the International Monetary Fund.  I include all Eurozone countries with available information on 
macroeconomic growth and legal efficiency measures.   
Second, I also analyze annual bank-level information from S&P Global Market Intelligence 
(formerly SNL Financial).  In contrast to most prior research on NPLs in Europe, I build on a 
dataset that includes actual NPLs and not impaired loans (e.g., as provided by Bankscope). 
Although, impaired loans are potentially a valid proxy of NPLs, they reflect an accounting concept 
(e.g., IAS 39 during my sample period) with substantial discretion (e.g. Ryan and Liu, 2006) 
compared to NPLs which are a supervisory construct (Regulation (EU) No 680/2014).  
Furthermore, while the ECB definition of NPLs includes all loans that are 90-days past due and the 
debtor is unlikely-to-pay (ECB 2017), the accounting definition (IAS 39) of impaired loans requires 
a dedicated ‘trigger event’ indicating that the loan will not be repaid in full.  As a consequence, the 
definition of NPLs is much broader than the concept of impaired loans.  Therefore, relying on 
impaired loans as a proxy for NPLs can lead to wrong conclusions if specific reporting incentives 
are embedded in the reporting of impaired loans. 
The final firm-level sample includes all banks that have available data on the macro-level 
variables (GDP and legal efficiency) and information on bank-level control variables (tier 1 
regulatory capital, total assets, loans, cost-to-income, return on assets).  The sample period for both 
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data sets spans the period from 2007 to 2016.  I end up with a maximum of 157 country-level 
observations and 14,151 firm-level observations. 
In my first set of analyses I employ the country-level dataset to answer the question whether 
legal efficiency and economic growth influence the duration of NPL cycles.  I test this prediction 
by employing a proportional hazard model to measure the influence of economic growth and legal 
efficiency on (i) the probability of reaching the maximum NPL level as a function of time since the 
start of the sample and (ii) the probability of achieving a decrease in NPLs as a function of time 
since the start of an economic growth phase.  Cox models are frequently employed in accounting, 
finance and economics to estimate the duration until a specific event while accounting for censoring 
due to incomplete information about individuals or firms (e.g., Bischof and Daske, 2013; Whited, 
2006; Maennasoo and Mayes, 2009; Meyer, 1990).  I estimate the following Cox proportional 
hazard model:  
 h(t) = ℎ0(𝑡) + β 𝑒
𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡   (1) 
Where h(t) is the hazard function and t is the time to the event (either the highest level of 
NPLs or when a decrease in NPLs was achieved).  ℎ0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard function. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
column vector including GDP growth and legal efficiency.  I collect data on GDP growth from the 
World Bank.  Furthermore, I employ data on legal efficiency measures related to insolvency and 
contract enforcement procedures from the annual World Bank Doing Business report (Djankov et 
al., 2003; Djankov et al., 2008).  The World Bank collects this data from own research, 
supplemented with data from central banks and the ‘Economist Intelligence Unit’.  I cluster 
standard errors by country (Petersen, 2009). 
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In the second set of analyses, I employ bank-level data from S&P Global Market 
Intelligence to explore whether macroeconomic, bank-specific or cross-country differences in legal 
efficiency are associated with NPLs over the economic cycles.  I start with an estimation of the 
following fixed effect OLS model over the sample period from 2006 to 2016:  
NPL Ratio = β0 + β1 Legal Efficiency + β2 GDP +  β3 Recovery  +  β4 Legal Efficiency * Recovery  
 +  β5 GDP * Recovery + ∑ βi Controls + ∑ βj Fixed Effects + ε (1) 
The dependent variable NPL Ratio is the percentage of non-performing loans divided by 
gross loans.  There are four main variables of interest.  GDP as the annual gross domestic product 
growth rate in the respective country obtained from the World Bank and Legal Efficiency that 
stands for a vector of binary partitioning variables that capture systematic variation in legal 
efficiency with respect to contract enforcement and insolvency procedures.  Furthermore, I explore 
whether GDP and Legal Efficiency have diverging effects over the economic cycle by interacting 
both variables with Recovery that stands for a binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ beginning 
from the first year a country enters an economic growth phase that lasts at least 3 years after 2009.29  
I use two sets of proxies for Legal Efficiency.  First, I use individual binary splits for 
countries that have above median Insolvency Durations, Insolvency Costs, Insolvency Recovery 
Rates, Contract Enforcement Durations, Contract Enforcement Costs, and Contract Enforcement 
Scores.  Second, I sum up all binary insolvency and contract enforcement measures (excluding 
only the enforcement score that itself captures a summary measure already) to build a composite 
Legal Efficiency Score.  In addition, I employ a binary partitioning variable that takes the value of 
‘1’ for countries with an above median Legal Efficiency Score (LE) that I label High Legal 
 
29  I use three consecutive economic growth years as proxy for a recovery to avoid misclassifying countries as 
“recovering” that were affected by the sovereign debt crisis in 2011/12 shortly after the great financial crisis. 
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Efficiency (High LE). The base effect of these split variables is time-invariant and therefore 
subsumed by the firm fixed effect. Controls denotes the following firm-level control variables:  
Size as the natural logarithm of total assets, RoA as the percentage of pre-provisioning income to 
total assets as a measure of banks’ profitability, Tier 1 as the percentage of banks’ tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets, Cost-Income as the percentage of operating expense to operating income 
measuring banks’ efficiency. Loan Ratio as the ratio of total gross loans to total assets.  I include 
year- and firm-fixed effects, which account for the general time trend as well as time-invariant 
bank and country characteristics (e.g., the overall quality of the legal system or the development of 
capital markets).  As such, my fixed-effects structure subsumes factors that are specific to a certain 
year or a particular bank.  In all my tests, I draw statistical inferences based on standard errors 
clustered by country to adjust for correlation between banks within countries and time-series 
correlation within countries (Petersen, 2009).  
I rely on a fixed effect model to deal with unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variables 
instead of a dynamic panel model with the lagged dependent variable as the I am particularly 
interested in the correlations between NPLs that build up with relative persistence during an 
economic downturn and decrease during an economic downturn.  Nevertheless, I follow the 
approach from Ghosh (2015) and confirm that my inference is robust within a dynamic panel 
system-GMM estimation including lagged NPLs as explanatory variable (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).30  
 
30  Furthermore, as the fixed effect estimator brackets the true effect (Guyan, 2001), I follow the recommendation 
from Angrist and Pischke (2008) and rely on a fixed effect model for my analyses. 
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3.4. Empirical results 
3.4.1. Descriptive statistics 
I start with a descriptive analysis of NPLs across countries. Figure 3.1 plots the yearly NPL 
ratios of countries with high and low legal efficiency.  The figure illustrates that on average 
countries follow a similar NPL growth trajectory until 2013 regardless of their legal efficiency.  
However, countries with high legal efficiency reach their highest NPL level in 2013, while still 
rising for countries with low legal efficiency.   
 
Figure 3.1 NPL Ratios and GDP Development for High vs. Low Legal Efficiency Countries 
      
 
Figure 3.1 shows the NPL Ratios development over the sample period from 2007-2016 for high and low legal 
efficiency countries. NPL Ratios are normalized to zero in 2013. 
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An obvious concern from this descriptive observation is that the NPL development could 
be simply a reflection of different economic growth patterns across countries that I capture with 
the legal efficiency measure.  However, when depicting GDP growth by legal efficiency in 
Figure 3.2, I document relatively similar average economic growth patterns across these two sets 
of countries.  From this descriptive analyses, I conclude that while both high and low legal 
efficiency countries follow similar patterns during the buildup phase of the NPL cycle that is likely 
determined by economic developments, countries that achieve significant reductions in NPLs are 
characterized by efficient insolvency and enforcement procedures that come into play during 
economic growth periods.    
 
Figure 3.1. GDP Development for High vs. Low Legal Efficiency Countries 
      
 
Figure 3.2 shows the GDP growth development over the sample period from 2007-2016 for high and low legal 
efficiency countries. GDP growth is normalized to zero in 2013. 
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I explore this conjecture in the next section with a more formal analysis. Additional 
descriptive statistics in Table 3.1, Panel A confirm that the average NPL ratio varies greatly across 
countries.  The NPL ratio varies between 0.4% in Luxembourg and 27% in Cyprus. Table 1, Panel 
B shows pairwise correlations between NPLs and GDP and legal efficiency measures. Legal 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.2. What determines the duration of non-performing loan cycles? 
In the first step of my empirical analysis, I run separate hazard models for two different 
time periods.  The first time period spans from the start of the sample period in 2007 until the 
country reaches its highest level of NPLs.  The second time period runs from the start of an 
economic expansion until the country decreases its NPLs for the first time.  My main interest 
concerns the duration of the second time period to explore whether macroeconomic factors or legal 
efficiency can increase the likelihood that a country achieves a reduction in NPLs.  Table 3.2, Panel 
A and B, show that the hazard of ending an increasing NPL phase is significantly higher for 
countries with high GDP growth while the influence of legal efficiency during the increasing NPL 
phase is insignificant.  Panel A, column (3) shows the hazard ratios of ending an increasing NPL 
phase is 19.3% higher for a one percentage point increase in GDP growth given that the country 
did not end the increasing NPL phase in the years before.  Panel A, Column (4)-(6), document that 
during economic expansions a higher GDP growth still significantly increases the hazard of 
entering a decreasing NPL phase.  However, the hazard ratio for high legal efficiency countries is 
almost 5 times as high compared to low legal efficiency countries documenting a substantial 
positive association between legal efficiency and the likelihood of achieving a NPL decrease.  
I continue the analyses by exploring whether the higher hazard of getting into a NPL 
reduction phase is related to inefficiencies in insolvency or contract enforcement procedures.  In 
Table 3.2, Panel C, Column (1)-(3) I first document that the duration of insolvency and contract 
enforcement procedures is not associated with the duration of an increasing NPL phase per se.  
However, both the duration of insolvency and contract enforcement procedures significantly reduce 





Table 3.2 Influence of legal efficiency and GDP on the duration of NPL cycles 
Panel A: Hazard Ratios for Legal Efficiency and GDP 
 Duration of NPL Increase Duration until NPL decrease in Recovery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
High LE 1.687   2.190 4.544**   4.985**  
 (0.303)   (0.132) (0.035)   (0.026)    
GDP   1.142** 1.193***   1.158* 1.198**  
   (0.018) (0.001)   (0.067) (0.012)    
 
            
N 133 133 133 26 26 26 
       
Panel B: Hazard Ratios for Enforcement Duration, Insolvency Duration, and GDP 
 Duration of NPL Increase Duration until NPL decrease in Recovery 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Insolvency Duration 0.988   1.023 0.716   0.602**  
  (0.947)   (0.907) (0.374)   (0.021)    
Enforcement Duration   0.876 0.872   0.178*** 0.132*** 
    (0.617) (0.623)   (0.005) (0.003)    
GDP 1.143** 1.128** 1.126** 1.180 1.104 1.102*   
  (0.011) (0.025) (0.019) (0.109) (0.107) (0.061)    
N 126 126 126 25 25 25    
Table 3.2 shows results from cox proportional hazard models reporting the effect of legal efficiency and economic 
growth on the duration of the two different phases of the NPL cycle. High LE is a binary variable that takes the value of 
‘1’ if the country is above the median legal efficiency of all countries in that year. GDP is the yearly GDP growth. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix D. We winsorize all variables at the 1% and at the 99% level. The table reports 
hazard ratios and (in parentheses) p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Taken together, the country-level analysis provides first indications that legal efficiency 
measures are significantly associated with the duration until NPLs decrease from the start of an 
upturn, while economic growth determines how NPLs build up during recessions.  In order to 
benchmark these findings against the influence of bank-specific factors, I continue in the next step 
with an analysis on the bank level. 
3.4.3. Country-level factors versus bank-specific determinants of NPLs 
I start the bank-level analysis with a correlation analysis in Table 3.3. Panel B shows that 
NPLs are negatively correlated with legal efficiency, GDP, profitability, and tier 1 capital while 
positively correlated with size, the loan ratio, and the cost-income ratio.  I explore these correlations 
more formally estimating the fixed effect OLS regression from model (2) in, Table 3.4.  Column (1) 
indicates that banks in high legal efficiency countries have on average 1.68% lower NPL ratios 
compared to banks in low legal efficiency countries (p-value<0.01).  Furthermore, in Column (4), 
I document that the negative association of legal efficiency is solely confined to expansion periods. 
The coefficient on High LE*Recovery documents that banks in high legal efficiency countries have 
on average a 6.6% lower NPL ratio (p-value<0.02) during economic upturns compared to low legal 
efficiency countries.  In addition, I find that during economic recovery periods banks have on 
average 2.5% higher NPL ratios (p-value<0.03).  The coefficient signs on my control variables 
show positive correlations between profitability, loan ratios, cost-income ratios31, tier 1 ratios and 
NPL ratios.  
 
31  This result is in favor of the bad luck hypothesis from Berger and DeYoung (1998). Under the bad luck hypothesis 
increases in problem loans are caused by exogenous events such as an economic downturn and subsequently 
require extra expenses for managing these exposures. Therefore, the additional expenses for NPL management 
create an impression of higher cost-to-income ratios (and hence, lower cost efficiency) for banks that put 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Test Variables:     
High LE -1.681***   -0.955 2.285    
 (0.002)   (0.209) (0.134)    
GDP   0.547 0.526 0.362**  
   (0.127) (0.152) (0.032)    
Recovery       2.562**  
       (0.021)    
High LE * Recovery       -6.634**  
                                                                   (0.015)    
GDP * Recovery       -0.045    
       (0.773)    
Control Variables:     
Size -0.065 0.221 0.181 -0.248    
  (0.875) (0.569) (0.656) (0.623)    
Loan Ratio -0.393* -0.380* -0.375* -0.319**  
  (0.065) (0.056) (0.054) (0.019)    
Cost-Income -0.016** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.014**  
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015)    
Tier 1  -0.053** -0.047* -0.047* -0.039    
  (0.045) (0.057) (0.054) (0.111)    
RoA -0.537* -0.584* -0.582* -0.521*   
  (0.068) (0.054) (0.054) (0.064)    
Constant 5.856 -0.914 0.288 5.621    
  (0.241) (0.848) (0.958) (0.382)    
          
Fixed Effects Year, Firm Year, Firm Year, Firm Year, Firm 
SE Clustered by Country Country Country Country 
Observations 14,151 14,151 14,151 14,151 
R-squared 0.129 0.150 0.151 0.249 
Adjusted R-squared 0.128 0.149 0.150 0.248 
Table 3.4 shows regression results for the effect of legal efficiency, economic growth and bank-specific factors on 
the level of banks’ non-performing loans ratio. High LE is a binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the country 
is above the median legal efficiency of all countries in that year. GDP is the yearly GDP growth. Recovery is a binary 
variable that takes the value of ‘1’ beginning in the first year that the country enters a period of three years consecutive 
GDP growth. All other variables are defined in Appendix D. We include year and firm fixed effects in the regressions, 
but do not report the coefficients. We winsorize all variables at the 1% and at the 99% level. The table reports OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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3.4.4. The role of contract enforcement and insolvency proceedings for NPLs 
I continue with a closer examination of the association between legal efficiency and NPL 
ratios. In particular, I study the role of insolvency and contract enforcement procedures for NPL 
ratios over the economic cycle.  For these additional cross-sectional tests, I replace the legal 
efficiency indicator variable in Equation (2) with six different binary partitioning variables that 
measure the efficiency of insolvency resolution and contract enforcement.  Table 3.5, Column 
(1)-(3) show that Insolvency Duration, Insolvency Costs, and Insolvency Recovery Rate are 
significantly associated with NPLs in recovery. Column (1) and (2) document that in expansionary 
periods an above median insolvency duration or above median insolvency costs are associated with 
NPL ratios that are on average approximately 7% higher compared to below median countries in 
recovery periods (p-value<0.02).  In addition, I find that banks in countries with a high Insolvency 
Recovery Rate experience on average 6.6% lower NPL ratios relative to banks in countries with 
low recovery rates during economic recoveries.  
I find corroborating results when looking at the three different contract enforcement 
measures. Table 3.5, Column (4)-(6) document that above median Enforcement Duration and 
Enforcement Costs are significantly positive associated with NPL ratios during economic upturns. 
Furthermore, banks in countries with overall better contract enforcement, and therefore, with a 
higher contract Enforcement Score experience on average 9% lower NPL ratios in economic 
upturns (p-value<0.01).  
Overall, my results confirm the hypothesis that insolvency and contract enforcement 
procedures are significantly associated with NPLs on the country and on the bank level.  
Furthermore, I document that this association is confined to economic recovery periods.  






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.4.5. Robustness tests  
In the last step, I perform three robustness tests that replicate Table 4 with different sets of 
additional control variables.  In Table 3.6, Column (1), I additionally interact all control variables 
with the binary Recovery variable to test whether the association between the bank-level control 
variables and NPLs changes over the business cycle.  I confirm the inference from Table 3.4, 
although the coefficient on High LE*Recovery is slightly lower (6.58 vs. -6.6, p-value<0.05).   
In the next step, I address concerns that NPL ratios that might also serve as a supervisory 
measure of financial stability are driven by supervisory power or general regulatory quality rather 
than legal efficiency.  In Column (2), I employ additional controls for supervisory power, private 
monitoring, external governance and the requirement for external audit from Barth, Caprio, 
Levine (2013).  My inference remains qualitatively and quantitatively robust. The main coefficient 
of interest Legal Efficiency * Recovery is significant at the 5% level although the effect size is 
slightly lower (-4.3 vs. -6.6, p-value<0.05).  However, I do not document a significant association 
between the proxies for supervisory power and NPLs. 
In Column (3), I alternatively employ additional control variables from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database to proxy for institutional differences and the 
strength of the legal system (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2011).  I proxy for six different 
constructs in this analysis:  Political stability, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, control of corruption and government effectiveness.  I continue to find a significant negative 
association between Legal Efficiency * Recovery and the NPL ratio although the effect size is again 
slightly lower (-5.2 vs. -6.6, p-value<0.05).  
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Overall, I show that the incremental association between legal efficiency and NPLs in 
economic upturns remains robust even when controlling for proxies of supervisory power, overall 














Test Variables:     
High LE  2.377 1.533 -0.245 
  (0.139) (0.417) (0.839) 
GDP  0.393** 0.495** -0.209 
  (0.022) (0.011) (0.137) 
Recovery  4.443** 2.791*** 1.502 
  (0.048) (0.006) (0.259) 
High LE * Recovery  -6.584** -4.334** -5.260** 
                                                              (0.013) (0.036) (0.015) 
GDP * Recovery  -0.058 -0.124 0.400* 
  (0.713) (0.632) (0.074) 
Control Variables:     
Size  -0.301 -0.347 -0.860 
   (0.494) (0.492) (0.162) 
Loan Ratio  -0.822 -0.306** -0.231*** 
   (0.175) (0.018) (0.000) 
Cost-Income  -0.024*** -0.014*** -0.003 
   (0.001) (0.003) (0.420) 
Tier 1   -0.026 -0.044* -0.038 
   (0.102) (0.060) (0.126) 
RoA  -0.624*** -0.502* -0.433* 
   -0.246 (0.090) (0.079) 
Constant  -0.301 -9.908 57.519*** 
   (0.494) (0.186) (0.001) 
       







Fixed Effects  Year, Firm Year, Firm Year, Firm 
SE Clustered by  Country Country Country 
Observations  14,151 14,151 14,151 
R-squared  0.258 0.366 0.366 
Adjusted R-squared  0.256 0.365 0.365 
Table 3.6 replicates Table 4 using additional control variables for the general regulatory and legal environment, and 
supervisory power. Column (1) includes an interaction between Recovery and all control variables (Size, Loan Ratio, 
Cost-Income, Tier 1, RoA). Column (2) adds five different proxies for the regulatory and supervisory environment from 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013): Supervisory Power, Private Monitoring, External Audit, and External Governance. 
Column (3) adds six different proxies for the general institutional environment from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2011): Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Rule of Law, Regulatory 
Quality, Voice and Accountability. High LE is a binary variable that takes the value of ‘1’ if the country is above the 
median legal efficiency of all countries in that year. GDP is the yearly GDP growth. Recovery is a binary variable that 
takes the value of ‘1’ beginning in the first year that the country enters a period of three years consecutive GDP growth. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix D. We include year and firm fixed effects in the regressions, but do not 
report the coefficients. We winsorize all variables at the 1% and at the 99% level. The table reports OLS coefficient 
estimates and (in parentheses) p-values based on robust standard errors clustered by country. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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3.5. Conclusion 
This paper has analyzed the determinants of NPLs from a new angle, one that explores the 
difference of macroeconomic, country-specific and bank-specific correlations with NPLs along the 
business cycle.  Using country-level data on NPLs, I find that the time period from the start of an 
economic upturn until a reduction in NPLs occurs, is significantly shorter for countries with high 
legal efficiency.  In addition, if insolvency and contract enforcement procedures are inefficient, 
this reduces the likelihood to get into a phase of decreasing NPLs even under favorable 
macroeconomic conditions. 
I corroborate these findings with a bank-level analysis benchmarking differences in legal 
efficiency against other determinants of NPLs, such as GDP growth, regulatory capital, 
profitability, and cost efficiency.  Similar to the evidence on the aggregate level, I find that banks 
in countries with high legal efficiency have on average incrementally lower NPLs during economic 
upturns.  That is, my results suggest that the association of legal efficiency with NPLs changes over 
the business cycle. Further analyses reveal that these effects are robust for several proxies of legal 
efficiency.  Furthermore, I provide evidence that the association of legal efficiency with NPLs is 
not confined to supervisory quality or the general regulatory quality within the country.  
Finally, the findings can help to inform regulators, policymakers and supervisors when 
addressing high NPL levels in the future.  This seems of particular relevance due to the recent 
pandemic-driven economic downturn that will likely result in NPL increases during the subsequent 
periods.  However, my results back up the view that bank regulators and supervisors may only have 
parts of the toolkit that is needed to foster a swift NPL resolution process after economic downturns. 
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3.6. Appendix D: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition / Description Data Source 
Firm-level Variables   
TIER 1 (Tier 1 capital / total risk-weighted assets)*100 Capital IQ MI 
Size Ln(total assets) Capital IQ MI 
Loan Ratio Total gross loans/ total assets Capital IQ MI 
Cost-Income  (Operating expenses / operating income)*100 Capital IQ MI 
RoA (Pre-provision net income / total assets)*100 Capital IQ MI 
NPL Ratio (Non-performing loans / total gross loans)*100 Capital IQ MI 
Country Variables   
GDP Yearly % growth in gross domestic product World Bank 
NPL Ratio (Non-performing loans / total gross loans)*100 World Bank 
Legal Efficiency (LE) Summary Measure: Number of measures for which a 
country is below the median of all sample countries: 
Insolvency duration. Enforcement duration, 
insolvency cost, enforcement costs, insolvency 
recovery rate. 
Djankov et al. (2003);  
Djankov et al., (2008) 
Insolvency Duration Above Median Average Duration for Insolvency 
Procedures 
Djankov et al., (2008) 
Enforcement. Duration Above Median Average Days for Contract 
Enforcement Procedures 
Djankov et al. (2003) 
Insolvency Costs Above Median Average Costs for Insolvency 
Procedures 
Djankov et al., (2008) 
Enforcement Costs Above Median Average Costs for Contract 
Enforcement Procedures 
Djankov et al. (2003) 
Insolvency. Rec. Rate Above Median Recovery Rate in Insolvencies Djankov et al., (2008) 
Enforcement. Score Above Median Contract Enforcement Score Djankov et al. (2003) 
Supervisory Power Whether the supervisory authorities have the 
authority to take specific actions to prevent and 
correct problems 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013) 
Private Monitoring Measures whether there incentives/ability for the 
private monitoring of firms, with higher values 
indicating more private monitoring 
Barth, Caprio, and  
Levine (2013) 
External Audit 
The effectiveness of external audits of banks 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013) 
External Governance Higher values indicate better corporate governance 
(audit, accounting, financial statement transparency, 
external ratings and credit monitoring) 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013) 
Corruption Control of corruption captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
Kaufmann, Kraay,  
and Mastruzzi (2011) 
Government Effectiveness Government effectiveness captures perceptions of 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 
Kaufmann, Kraay,  
and Mastruzzi (2011) 
Political Stability and  
Absence of Violence 
Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically 
motivated 
violence, including terrorism. 
Kaufmann, Kraay,  
and Mastruzzi (2011) 
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3.6 Appendix D (continued) 
 
Variable Definition / Description Data Source 
Rule of Law Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence. 
Kaufmann, Kraay,  
and Mastruzzi (2011) 
Regulatory Quality Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
Kaufmann, Kraay,  
and Mastruzzi (2011) 
Voice and Accountability  Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the 
extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. 
Kaufmann, Kraay,  
and Mastruzzi (2011) 
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Concluding Remarks 
This thesis presents three essays on financial reporting incentives and bank transparency. While 
the first study documents the importance of manager incentives and preferences for banks’ 
accounting choices, the second and the third study explore firm- and country-specific incentives 
that matter for banks’ accounting and reporting behavior.  
Chapter 1 investigates the role of individual managers in the financial reporting of banks. 
Exploiting the connectedness between different managers as well as a set of plausibly exogenous 
manager turnovers, we find that managerial idiosyncrasies explain approximately 19% of banks’ 
discretionary loan loss provisions. We identify common patterns in bank managers’ reporting 
behavior over time that point at general differences in the idiosyncratic influence across managers. 
Using these differences to construct bank manager profiles, we document how the role of individual 
manager types interacts with top management team composition. Overall, divergence in the 
revealed preferences of the top management team for different accounting and policy choices 
significantly confines the idiosyncratic manager influence on banks’ loan loss provisioning 
Chapter 2 investigates how supervisors influence bank transparency through supervisory 
disclosures and public enforcement. Upon adoption of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
for major Eurozone banks, the European Central Bank (ECB) as the new supervisor undertook a 
comprehensive review of bank balance sheets and publicly disclosed the results of this Asset 
Quality Review (AQR). The AQR disclosures revealed what the ECB perceived to be a substantial 
overvaluation of bank assets, and in particular problem loans. The magnitude of the AQR 
adjustments varied substantially across supervised banks. We exploit this firm-level variation as 
well as the staggered introduction of the SSM to analyze the change in affected banks’ reporting 
behavior and transparency. The ECB’s preference for more conservative reporting is associated 
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with higher levels of loan loss provisions and non-performing loan classifications in the following 
periods. Pointing at the role of enforcement institutions, this reporting effect is particularly 
pronounced for firms whose prior national supervisors were more likely to be captured by political 
interest. At the same time, corresponding positive liquidity effects are concentrated among SSM 
banks that were exposed to potential pressure from market forces. Our findings suggest that 
supervisory disclosures are potentially effective in establishing greater transparency of the banking 
sector, but depend on the presence of firm-level incentives that help establish market discipline. 
Finally, in Chapter 3, I investigate the role of legal efficiency for banks’ non-performing loans 
along the business cycle in 17 European countries. During the global financial crisis and the 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis all European countries experienced a substantial increase in NPLs. 
I find that increases in NPLs are mainly associated with macroeconomic and bank-specific 
determinants. However, I recognize that substantial differences in the duration and efficiency of 
the NPL resolution after the crisis exist. I exploit cross-country differences in insolvency and 
contract enforcement procedures to document that non-performing loans are associated with the 
duration and the costs of insolvency and contract enforcement during economic growth phases. My 
findings suggest that the duration of the decreasing NPL phase depends on the presence of an 
efficient insolvency and contract enforcement regime that ensures swift non-performing loan 
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